THE UNBRIDGEABLE CHASM BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEISM
If
Joe Darrow’s report, Science and Religion, The Port Times Record, November
09, 2006, of Reverend Guy J. Consolmagno’s lecture at Stony Brook
University is accurate in its attempt to narrow or erase the divide between
“religion and science,” it is evident that not enough attention has been
given to the interpretation of language particularly since so much of it is
couched in metaphor, euphemisms, and poetic irrelevancies, i.e., nonobjective expressions.
At the outset, to address the issue of science
versus theism, as the Reverend is reported to have presented it, requires at
least a perfunctory comment about the abuse of language and the uses of the two
terms, ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism.’
Theistic
authorities are fully aware that our societies and schooling institutions are
not interested in, not capable of, or are completely lacking in understanding
the importance of distinguishing falsifiable, verifiable, concrete, predictably
recurrent related language of perception from unfalsifiable, unverifiable,
abstract, hypothetical, metaphorical, supernatural, and transcendental language.
Nor do they wish to alert them to the fact that there is no such thing as
absolute truth and knowledge.
Consequently, no one calls them to task for the
games they play with language enabling them, as George Orwell warned, to control
the thinking and behavior of the general public.
They do not dare teach that every declarative
statement is preceded by an unspoken “if”; or if not that, then by a spoken
or unspoken preceding or proceeding “according to available evidence.”
Such egregious negligence by the powers that be, in
the world of what is euphemistically called “education” plays right “into
the hands” of those who by design or with nefarious intentions or out of
ignorance enables them to manipulate language to their own advantage.
Theists, for centuries have utilized this absence
of interest in understanding the lack of clarity in metaphorical euphemisms.
Not only have they succeeded in retarding the advance of science for
centuries but, having failed to undermine it completely, are still hard at work
to convince the general public that there is little fundamental difference in
the way science and theism arrive at their beliefs.
They unabashedly admit that their theistic edifice
is founded on faith—blind faith, in spite of evidence and in the absence of
evidence while at the same time subtly and convincingly insinuate that they have
absolute knowledge of an unknowable god’s existence, describing him (it, she?)
in great detail.
If they can convince the general public, as it is
evident the reverend is attempting to do, which has little understanding of the
catastrophic dangers inherent in the misuse of language, that “scientific
knowledge is metaphor, non-objective, and is not literally true,” they can
succeed in undermining respect for science and will maintain the power and
authority that they have gained throughout history abusing language to the
detriment of peace on earth.
By paralleling the beliefs of science with an
unfalsifiable description of “God,” Reverend Consolmagno hopes to shore up
his claims for His existence.
However, he seems to ignore the fact that the
unbridgeable chasm existing between the untestable edicts of theism and the
self-corrective theories, laws, and methods of science includes many more dogmas
than merely blind faith in the complex expanse of theistic dogmas relating to a
never evident divine being defined in unfalsifiable language.
The lack of reference to them is glaring in their absence.
As to ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism,’ if
one could call a symposium of the philosophers and thinkers throughout history
to discuss these too terms, it would soon become apparent that no agreement as
to the “correct” use of them could be achieved.
The reason for this is that all efforts to arrive
at one, as to the present, appears to rest on discovering some kind of abstract,
singular, and absolute ontology of meaning relating to the multiplicity of
“levels” of language upon which they are used.
Until our philosophers, thinkers and teachers pay
serious attention to the fact that no linguistic symbol has an inherent meaning,
even as they refer to “usage” of the terms, they subconsciously, in
ignorance, or willfully ignore the fact and continue to emulate the dog chasing
his own tail, i.e., a “will o’ the wisp,” succeeding in accomplishing an
expansion of the abusive use of both terms diminishing even more the
effectiveness of their multiple attributed “meanings.”
Obviously we can play linguistic games with the
term, ‘objectivity.’ Even as
the reverend says, “Metaphor is the only way we know to describe what we’re
talking about, clearly he seems oblivious to the serious implications to be
drawn regarding the true relationship of our metaphorical language to our
perceptions and conceptions.
If the reverend feels obliged to apply the
linguistic metaphors, “nonobjective,” “not literally true,” etc., to
science because the scientists are not in touch with Immanuel Kant’s
“ding-an-sich” (i.e., the thing-in-itself), he is also obliged to use the
metaphors relating to scientific perceptions describing them as verifiable,
predictable, recurrable, and falsifiable in counter description of theism to
which such metaphoricals cannot truthfully be applied -- but more of this
later.
The basis of his lecture is
essentially predicated upon his fundamental assumption that scientists must have
faith (a euphemism for “conditioned conviction”) similar to that of a
theist’s blind faith in an unknowable god.
Subsumed under that faith are his
three other assumptions that he claims scientists believe without reservation,
1) “in the absence of evidence that the universe actually exists,” 2)
“that the universe makes sense,” and 3) the “dual assumptions that there
are laws, not chaos, governing the physical universe, and that human beings can
discover them.”
Obviously the reverend has a limited sense of the
uses of the term, ‘evidence’ giving no explication of the term, leaving the
impression that evidence is strictly “empirical,” that is discoverable by
direct observation, beyond our perceptions.
In addition to that, he went to great lengths to define “science” as
merely “metaphorical and nonobjective.”
The conclusion to be drawn from the reverend’s
thesis is that thinking of the language of knowledge as metaphor, he has shown
the faith of theism and science to be “similar.”
In doing so, he is, possibly unwittingly,
indicating that there is no evidence for the existence of his god also, without
ever openly admitting it.
It would seem that the reverend’s reference to
science being “ultimately nonobjective” is disingenuous, exaggerated, or at
least confused. The weakness of his argument is his abuse of the terms,
‘ultimately’ and ‘nonobjective.’ The
former implies that the whole of science is based on blind faith and the latter
is misdirected at science.
All objective evidence is nothing more than
predictive recurrence of perception. To
attribute to a perception what it is not would be, in my view, a nonobjective
claim.
There is, of course, a world of difference between
the nonobjective “must be” of theism unsupported by any public perceptual
evidence, and “must be” of science supported by evidence predictably and
recurrently perceptive, therefore objective.
The reverend is guilty, though I suspect unwittingly, of committing the
fallacy of the straw man attack.
It seems clear that his motivation was, as is that
of most Jesuits, to give the impression that there is a weakness in the
scientific enterprise and to show an unassailable parallel between the ways in
which scientists and theists arrive at their beliefs.
Not mentioned, of course, was the role played
through indoctrination (a euphemism for conditioning) of the minds of helpless
and innocent children. Another
euphemism is the term, “religion,” instead of the intended meaning,
“theism.”
Obviously his motivation was not to “help”
science or to “strengthen” its image. It
is rather an attempt to put the hoped for “validity” of theism on an equal
footing with science. It is theism
that is competing for the hearts and minds of the world’s population.
The competitive attributes of science lie within
not outside its own structure. There
is nothing it can gain by competing with theism whereas theism has everything to
gain if it can show the world that its claims are as legitimate as are those of
science.
It is important to distinguish between the two
terms, ‘religion’ and ‘theism.’ Not
all religions are predicated upon the existence of a god.
For instance, Einstein said, “I am a deeply
religious non-believer.”
There
may well be a god. However, as
Biblically defined, there is no way to verify it -- faith in Christ incarnate
aside.
As to his fundamental assumption, obviously faith
plays a role in science. Every
person in the world has faith, even atheists and agnostics have, related
to everyday events in their lives.
However, it is not blind conditioned faith in a
god that eventually evolved out of countless concepts of gods in the
polytheistic ages or gods of today.” Rather,
it is trust in the evidence of past experience.
Nobody worships, trusts, or has faith in a
god. Each worshiper has
faith in his personal, nonobjective concept of a god without the
critical or analytical ability to discern the difference
As to the first of his subsumed assumptions, this
is a more complicated issue in need of extensive explication.
It calls for an examination of our uses and abuses of language in
general, as well as an inquiry into how such terms as ‘evidence,’
‘objective,’ ‘metaphorical,’ and others are used.
Suffice it to say, for the present, if one assumes
there is no evidence as to why we believe there is a universe beyond our
perceptions, possesses and expresses no curiosity about the possibility for it,
one is not likely to seek, or find, any, particularly since science is not
spending billions of dollars proselytizing its existence.
His second subsumed assumption is also subject to
the above comment with this caveat: In
the approximately two hundred and fifty year history of science, though a case
can be made that it extends beyond that, much sense has been made, with abundant
predictable evidence to show for it, about the universe we know, i.e., our
perceptions of a presumed universe beyond them.
As to the final subsumed assumption, it too applies
to the universe of perceptions we know. No
credible scientist presumes, in fact, to claim discovery of
physical laws even though they so often carelessly, habitually, and even
sometimes deliberately abuse our language causing those uninformed of the
methods of science to interpret the language falsely.
What they discover are perceptions of predictable
recurrence of other perceptual events that they subsequently describe and codify
into what we deem to be laws, theories, rules, etc.
The reverend appears, if he does believe there is a
real universe beyond our perceptions, also to be ignorant of the fact, whatever
the nature of the universe may be, that ‘chaos’ and ‘order’ are value
terms and that chaos is a form of order.
Surely he has heard of “chaos theory” or at least witnessed the
“chaos” of a child’s bedroom that some movie director might like to
reproduce for his film.
The Reverend claims science “is ultimately
nonobjective -- it requires a belief in a universe characterized by order and
intelligibility, a belief similar to faith in God.”
The dictionary defines the term, ‘objective’ as
“having to do with a known or perceived object [such as a tree] as
distinguished from something existing only in the mind of a person thinking” [like
a concept of a god].
Faith in science, however, is trust in perceptually
recurrent evidence [the “tree”] until new evidence shows a need
for refinement or correction.
It is not enough to say,
“Science and religion rest on belief.”
Much depends on the nature of the belief.
Is its language warranted (based on evidence) or unwarranted (incapable
of being based on evidence)?
The Reverend says: “All scientific discovery
comes from the motivation and perspective of the scientist making the
observation.”
In this day and age, not only do scientists work in
teams but also, the claims and discovery of any one scientist are immediately
subject to the final judgment of the worldwide scientific community.
When the Reverend says, “Thinkers like Stephen J.
Gould miss the point: Science and religion meet in the human being who is the
scientist, the human being who is the believer,” it is he who misses the
point.
Obviously “science and religion” are intended
to mean, “the beliefs of science and religion (i.e., theism).”
If so, he does not seem to understand that the
symbols of language are tools having no inherent meaning, and how much and
atrociously it is abused allowing countless nonsensical, unfalsifiable beliefs
to be held by the uninformed and promulgated by those in seats of power.
Their beliefs too “meet in the human being” who is firmly convinced
they are true.
Scientific achievements and language are
self-corrective, predictable, public, testable, and verifiable.
Theistic dogmas and conditioned beliefs are not.
This very fact is evidence that the edifice and
achievements of science are independent of whether there is a world beyond our
sense faculties. The theories,
laws, experiments, mathematics, etc., are self-corrective tools through which
scientists arrive at the conclusions that have so benefited humanity.
In the case of theism, however, its unfalsifiable
dogmas are indispensable, i.e., non-corrective and not to be questioned.
Lack of faith in them by the masses would mean the end of theism's control
of the beliefs and behavior of its flock.
Moreover, the end of belief in “sin” would
force theists to seek other employment..
It is to be admitted that Reverend Consolmagno
alludes to important verifiable facts and philosophical issues.
It is unfortunate that he interprets them through the lens of his
conditioned and unfalsifiable theistic language of his convictions.
No doubt, fundamentally, he is referring to the perennial philosophical
issue of “appearance and reality.” He
is essentially correct when he says, “Metaphor is the only way we know to
describe what we’re talking (i.e., semaphoring) about,” though there are
other ways to communicate. But let
us be clear: what we are describing is our personal interpretation of our
perceptions.
He is quoted having said, “Human eyes interpret
what and how we do, and what we will perceive when we get there.”
He is concerned to show that this applies to scientists’ claims as well
as those of the rest of us. In that
respect, even if not literally, he is, without question, correct.
He neglects to point out, however, that in the
history of man, probably 99 per cent of the population, including his “true
believers” had and have no clue about that fact. Moreover, their beliefs are generally synonymous with the
correspondence theory of truth despite all its weaknesses.
In any case to claim, assuming he understands the
functions of language, “similarity to faith in ‘God,’” is not only an
arrogant excessive stretch, but, as well, in contradiction, puts him in
opposition to the Biblical reference to a possibility of plurality of gods
(given the term, ‘Elohim,' as used in Genesis and Exodus, with all its ambiguities) and clearly exposes him
to the charge that the countless gods of other religions, throughout the history
of human beings were and are false gods.
What I found to be disingenuous of the reverend, or
at least uninformed, was his resort to the fallacy of the small sample in citing
differences of opinion among some scientists, at the same time offering,
“science works.”
He seems little impressed by the enormous
contributions to the health, well-being, technological advances, and predictive
understanding of the perceptual recurrence of events of the universe, all of
which, to the reverend, are “metaphorical.”
Is he acceding to William James’ theory of truth
that, “What works is true”? Perhaps
he should consider, the converse, “What is true works.”
Moreover, he seems to have a limited and skewed
concept of why one would be inclined to do science, declaring simplistically
though poetically, “Every human [sic] scientist has chosen to be a scientist
for reasons of the heart, for reasons, Reason does not know.”
(Wow!)
His comment that “the meaning of knowledge
depends on the context we put it in” and “that context is always a human
context” is quite vague, or, to say the least, simplistic.
Knowledge, probabilistic in nature, is a warranted
state of mind about our perceptions of the assumed existence of things in our
environment with which we assumedly come in contact. Can it be otherwise? And,
the knowledge acquired from within a “forward moving present” represents the
source of new evidence that underlies the self-corrective mantra of science that
is lacking in theistic dogma.
There is no doubt of the accuracy
of the reverend’s claim that science is not purely objective if he
means by that merely what we can all agree upon, i.e., that science does not
have empirical evidence that it is perceiving a physical universe.
No credible scientist would claim to the contrary.
If he means that science has no justifiable reason to believe there is a
“physical” universe beyond our perceptions, this is a claim that is in need
of revisiting in light of the shadow cast upon our use of the term, ‘empirical
evidence’ which literally does not exist when used in conjunction with the
term, ‘the physical universe,’ as suggested by Einstein who stated,
“The only justification for our concepts and
systems of concepts is that they serve to represent the complex of our
experiences; beyond this they have no legitimacy.”
Surely this can clearly be interpreted to be
stating that any claim to any interpretation of the term, ‘objectivity’
implying existence of any imaginable kind beyond our perceptions has “no
legitimacy in fact.”
It needs to be said, however, that it does not rule
out a justification of belief that there is, based on certain aspects of our
perceptions.
Concepts, as John Dewey so wisely stated, are
instruments. By analyzing these
tools we will acquire the experience that there is some empirical justification
that even the reverend lives by, for believing in a world beyond our senses.
As we shall see, an analysis of our uses of language may show that
Einstein’s statement is subject to minor equivocation.
As to the differences of opinions that existed or
exist among various scientists, is the reverend not aware of the human
proclivity to differ among personalities possessing different upbringing,
values, and viewpoints? Scientists
too, are first human beings possessing all the foibles of other human beings.
But unlike the conditioning upbringing of theistic
dogma, science is founded upon a self-corrective principle wherein the passage
of time and the finding of new evidence bring about agreement.
If scientists did not trust, i.e., have faith, in
their methods in the face of verifiable facts (Perceptions are facts too.),
deduced from the application of their hypotheses, laws, observations,
experiments, induction, and the like, there would be no scientific achievements
such as have made life much more comfortable and interesting for humanity.
If one
cannot see that the application of man’s intelligence has made all this
possible, then one is willfully blind and is guilty of denying the evidence in
typical fashion of that state of mind by which the true believer accepts claims
in spite of the absence of evidence and despite evidence to the contrary.
Moreover it is a crime against humanity, that the
theistic edifices of history have so thoroughly conditioned a vast measure of
the populace to have blind faith in a biblically admitted unknowable divine
entity in clear contradiction of the absence of personal intervention of some
supreme being -- “acts of God,” aside.
Another
fallacy, theistic authorities have a fondness for, is the fallacy of an appeal
to authority. Typically the
authority is the Bible, i.e., the writings of the men who wrote the scriptures
in the absence of knowledge of science, a deceased theistic authority, the
Biblical God, the legend of Christ, as opposed to the assumed “living
Christ,” and the like.
The reverend, striving to justify his contention
that there is no difference between the faith of theistic religion and science,
resorts to quoting the “prince” of science, Albert Einstein: “I know how
the universe works. God is subtle;
he is not malicious. . . . God would
not have fooled me that way.”
Either the reverend neglected to point out or is
unaware that Einstein also said,
“I cannot conceive of a personal God who would
directly influence the actions of individuals, or would directly sit in judgment
on the creatures of His own creation. I
cannot do this in spite of the fact that mechanistic causality has, to a certain
extent, been placed in doubt by modern science. My religiosity consists in a humble admiration of the
infinitely superior spirit that reveals itself in the little that we, with our
weak and transitory understanding, can comprehend of reality. Morality is of the highest importance – but for us, not for
God.”
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any living
human being believes that we don’t know there is a universe.
Why? The answer lies in the
fact that we experience a universe of perceptions, a la Bishop George Berkeley
who proclaimed, “To be is to be perceived.”
Note, I’m not agreeing with him, nor could I
ever, considering that he is referring to an immaterial God’s perceiving it.
One might argue as to whether perceptions are real
as is argued by so many phenomenological philosophers, like, for instance,
Jean-Paul Sartre in his Being and Nothingness in which he argues
that being is nothingness.
Now there’s a twist on meaningful language if
there ever were one. I cannot, for
the life of me fathom what sensible meaningfulness can be attributed to it.
Moreover, the history of philosophy is pregnant
with such unverifiable language.
As
Bertrand Russell observed:
"The failure to consider language
explicitly has been a cause of much that was [sic, is] bad in traditional
philosophy."
Though this is not the time or place to discuss
such an issue, I am wary of being one of those people to whom S. I. Hayakawa
referred in his book, Language in Thought and Action (first edition),
when he said,
“Educated people
are best at hiding their ignorance by using big words.”
Hence, I shall simply ask, “Has there ever been any evidence that ‘something’ can evolve from nothing” or be created by nothing, i.e., an immaterial god?
On the one hand, one does not have to be a rocket
scientist to recognize the technological progress achieved by the methods of
science, even if we know about it only by our predictable and recurrent
perceptions.
On the other hand, if George Santayana is correct
in declaring religion and theism to be forms of art, not to be confused with
reality or beauty, though much of it is experienced as beautiful, there is every reason to
believe that science too involves art and beauty.
After all, anything not ‘born” of nature but
created by man is a form or art. Aspects
of it beheld in the eyes of some beholders are experienced as beautiful, in the
eyes of others are not.
Scientists, like Einstein, the violinist, being
human beings, view much of their scientific achievements including their
mathematical formulas and scientific theories as art.
Because of the obvious accompanying beauty and
sense of spirituality that scientists -- experience in science, the reverend
says, “Scientists are likely to trust theories that are beautiful,” and that
the study of science “is driven out of a love of the elegant.
Somehow, I cannot fathom how, the reverend came to
the conclusion that scientists, as the reporter noted, “. . . are likely to trust
theories that are beautiful."
I can understand “partly driven,” but “is
driven” implying “at the expense of pursuit of truth and knowledge” is
clearly questionable.
I
detect no evidence that leads to the reverend’s judgment that they “trust
beauty,” as I interpret the phrase.
Whatever happened to the clearly recognized curious
nature of every newborn child without which knowledge of science would be
“dead in the water”?
The pursuit of elegance, spirituality, and beauty
are Johnny-come-lately personal values that would not exist were they not
preceded by an innate curiosity.
Moreover, if the history of
theism is any evidence, whatever art and good it accomplished, it more than
countered it with false comfort, religious crusades, inquisitions, contention,
persecution, torture and terror, dictatorial law and order, power of the state,
pogroms, conditioned mentalities, faith’s reliability upon pie in the sky at
the expense of man’s faith in his own talented propensities, and the
confiscation of enormous
wealth used over the centuries for proselytizing, through ecclesiastical means
of indoctrination, for the inhuman treatment of heretics.
In a reference to spiritual
and intellectual lives and an apparent admission that he knows, in the absence
of evidence, there is a universe, the reverend comments, “If we close our eyes
to our universe, we are closing our eyes to God,” he seems to use the term
‘spiritual’ and even ‘beauty’ in a theistic sense.
Apparently he’s forgotten
the original usage, “breath,” and another evolutionary usage, “mind,”
before the term, ‘spiritual,’ acquired a theistic attribution. He does concede, however, with some vagueness, to a human aspect of it when he
declares, that beauty, both in human spiritual and intellectual lives, “is the
source of what we trust.”
But for those who believe that “spiritual
truths” (I confess I don’t know what can be meant by that phrase), can be
tested by appealing to “100 percent of the population,” clearly shows
ignorance of the fact that one cannot verify a truth merely by voting. “50 million Frenchmen can be wrong.”
I find the looseness with which he uses such
language to be quite disconcerting in its vagueness not alone in its possible
falsity.
It is commonly understood that what is beautiful is
a contentious concept, recognized as “in the eyes of the beholder.”
I have no trouble understanding “enjoying
beauty.” But to imply that
scientists believe, “If it is beautiful, it will work,” is a disservice to
their intelligence, unless, of course the attribution of “It will work,” is
now part of the conventional use of the term, ‘beautiful.’
Moreover to speak of “trusting” beauty
makes no sense. Waxing poetically,
he seems to take language at face value.
Most of the artistic language in the history of
humanity, from religious, poetic, fictional, or musical, etc., has elicited a
range of sensations of beauty from none to some extremely painful.
However, the function of the language of beauty and
art is not to convey truth and knowledge that is to be trusted – or not.
Rather it is to elicit an aesthetic emotion – not necessarily happiness
– that is in tune with one’s personal life-experiences.
For instance consider the beauty one experiences in
enjoying a movie that has one reduced to tears because of its sadness or the
sense of beauty exemplified in a movie theme in which a professional assassin
exclaimed, in admiration of the manner in which a private detective “turned
the tables on him,” “Beautiful!” as he fell dead to the floor.”
The reverend surely does not understand the method
of science if he truly believes that it gives precedence to the experience of beauty
and spirituality in science over, predictability, testability, recurrence,
verifiability, evidence, observation, and the principle of self-correction -- admittedly all terms in need of examination of their relationship to our
perceptions and our sense of beauty.
It is usually agreed that most attributed meanings
for such terms are conventional usage and culturally inherited and recorded in
dictionaries. Even though the
reverend recognizes the fact that all language is metaphor, it is apparent that
he has not given enough subtlety of thought to what was the “object” to
which these terms, and in particular the terms, ‘objective’ or
‘nonobjective’ were originally directed -- and still are.
Nor does he seem to recognize the distinction to be
drawn between first and second order metaphors.
When he says, “Science is not objectively
true,” He is personally attributing to his claim a kind of absolutivity of
value above and beyond the fact that the phrase is a tool -- a metaphor --
expressing his thoughts -- in this case non-perceptively based thoughts.
Is it not also a metaphorical term?
And are not all metaphorical terms ultimately abstract terms?
If so, is it not important to distinguish between
“abstract” for all terms and “abstract” when distinguishing between
terms related to perception and those not?
In that case, is not the second order of abstract
metaphors also a form of the fallacy of begging the question, i.e, not supported
by evidence?
There is good reason to believe that the two
symbols, ‘objective,’ and ‘nonobjective,’ “infinitely” small parts
of a language system, were meant to be conventional in nature.
In
that sense, the objects of the terms, historically and presently, were and are,
even if unknowingly by the masses, being applied to the “existence” or
non-existence of perceptions not of an assumed universe beyond them.
Since
the perceptions are the objects referred to by the scientific language -- the
“metaphorical” language is considered to be objective, denotative, and
public.
There is no
observable external universe to
language about.
Hence it is the language of scientific
"observation," i.e., of predictively recurring perceptions, that is, without question, objective, or
not, while the language of theism, without question, is not.
As the reverend should know,
fundamentally our language, expressing our thoughts and attributed meanings, is
dualistic in nature, as probably it has been since the dawn of man.
It is directly related to our perceptions
and conceptions, referred to as public -- or private,
of an assumed external world. It
is not directly related to an unperceived world.
It makes no sense to claim that language is about anything other than our
ideas and perceptions.
The issue, therefore, is whether there is any
justifiable mode to account for external causes of them.
It is our language, i.e., the meanings of our
thoughts, not an external world that is referred to as public, or private,
objective or nonobjective.
Surely an informed person would not believe that
all the “things” we language about, that is attribute meaning to, are
nothing more than language.
The
reverend also said, "While . . . science is not objectively true, it doesn’t
mean it’s invalid. What can he
possibly mean?
Only arguments, from a logical point of view and
conventional uses aside, can be valid of invalid.
The hypotheticals of hypothetico-deductive
arguments elicit nothing more than hypothetical conclusions.
The
whole edifice of scientific ideas based on predictably recurrent perceptions
should hardly, practically, be reduced to a
hypothetical “argument.”
And, surely when our perceptions, i.e.,
“observation,” of a falling object in a vacuum is publicly observed and
measured to fall according to the equation S=1/2gt2, this can hardly be said to
be merely valid “not objective” even if the caveat, “All language is
metaphor about perception,” is granted.
Then as if “The Scandal of Particularity” of
Catholic theology were an apt analogy with the scientific discovery that atoms
are discrete entities, the reverend gave the partially unfalsifiable explanation
that “ . . . humans live and die, make their choices and are responsible to God
for them, all ultimately as individuals.”
Surely this is not true of atheists and agnostics
who would argue: “We perceive
that ‘humans live and die,’ but it is, according to available evidence,
impossible ever to verify that they “are responsible to God.” Is the reverend not begging the question in
referring to science, i.e., scientific language, as nonobjective?
Are not the terms, ‘objective’ and
‘nonobjective’ also metaphorical hypostatization of values?
And is not the reverend’s God” an abstract,
metaphorical, not to mention supernatural, transcendental, and metaphysical
hypostatization?
Are not all hypostatizations and abstractions a
form of “the fallacy of begging the question?
It is quite clear to any informed person that all
language is metaphor, characterized as “dead” i.e., denotative or expressed
in concrete terms or as “live, ” i.e., connotative or expressed in abstract
terms predicated upon the fact that it is in reference to our experience, i.e.,
perceptions of an assumed “real” world, not necessarily of a physical
universe.
In the case of language, however, it is incumbent
upon us to be wary of its “begging the question” possibilities.
With apologies to Bishop George Berkeley and David
Hume, to say the least, an abstract term begs the question of particularity,
discrete perception, or even existence.
It serves the purpose only of intensifying the
metaphorical character of language and creating the impression of clear
communication.
Metaphorical linguistic abstractions not related to
perceptions must not be equated with abstractions that are related to
perceptions. The latter are
perceptive the former are not.
The
reverend and I are in agreement regarding the metaphoric nature of language
which, of course, includes the two terms, ‘objective’ and ‘nonobjective.
We seem to be involved in a verbal disagreement, not a real one.
Each of us is interpreting the language of the agreement differently.
The argument revolves around to what it is that the
terms are referring.
I
argue, since all language is metaphor it is about two fundamentally different
kinds of experience, i.e., perceptions and conceptions.
He argues that it is about the thing-in-itself
beyond our perceptions.
Let us bear in mind; no informed person equates
conceptions with a reality beyond our perceptive experiences except for our
conceptions of memories of perceptions.
We do not agree as to the significance of this
contention. Since he has been
reported to say that science is not literally true but is metaphor and quoted as
having said, “Metaphor is the only way we know to describe what we’re
talking about,” This issue, too, clearly needs to be revisited.
Does it not follow logically that his claim, that
“Science is not literally true but is metaphor,” turns back upon itself?
Where do we go from there?
Is not his statement a metaphor about a metaphor,
i.e., science? This leads to the
question, “What is ‘science’ a metaphor of?”
The answer quite obviously and in fact is “about our perceptions and
conceptions,” not a physical reality beyond them.
The term, “non-objective,” implies that there
is a total absence of evidence that there is a universe, whatever may be meant
by the use of that metaphorical expression, and that if there is no
evidence of order, events in the universe cannot be made sense of.
Apparently, the reverend is not doing his homework
about the uses of such language as “literal truth,” “evidence,”
“objective,” truth and knowledge, or of the “ultimate” implication that
all language is metaphor.
If one fails to distinguish between kinds of
metaphor and is unaware that symbols do not have inherent meanings, it is
understandable why one would arrive at different conclusions.
Clearly, he uses these terms as if all of them have
the quality of absoluteness despite clear evidence that the predictability of
recurrence of perceptions is undeniable evidence that an abundance of sense is
being derived about an assumed interaction of assumed matter.
There is, for example, such a concept as “circumstantial evidence.”
What the reverend further does not seem to
understand is that underlying the “faith,” he attributes to science, is the
methodological fact that were evidence presented to science (i.e., scientists)
that scientific beliefs (i.e., conclusions) were wrong, science’s
self-corrective mantra would instantly “kick in.” With theistic dogma, evidence plays no such role.
I suggest the following: It is agreed 1) that all language is metaphor,. 2) It is
not about a reality beyond our perceptions. 3) It is about our perceptions.
Considering that scientists do not concern
themselves with what appears to be a philosophic concern and have no problem
ignoring the issue David Hume raised denying the possibility of acquiring
knowledge of cause and effect, or whether there is a universe beyond our
perceptions, since the issue in no way effects their methods and achievements,
obviously it makes no sense to accuse science or scientists of being
nonobjective.
It just does not matter to science whether there is
a “physical” universe.
Their language is about what they do
experience, i.e., perceptions. As
the reverend said, “Science
works.” Should or even ought one
ask for more? Whether scientists do
or don’t have such concerns, does not alter their methods one wit.
Wondering whether he is aware of the various
theories of truth, I find it curious that he would assert that science, being
only metaphor, is not literally true. The
same can be said about all human claims to knowledge, including the language of
theistic dogma.
At least science is predicated upon a complex of
public methodological human endeavors not through mere unsubstantiated edicts.
But more than that, considering that there could be
no truth or knowledge in the absence of language, i.e., the mental function of
attributing meaning to our experiences through the mental acts of symbolizing,
referring, and inferring, by his interpretation, there is no such thing as
literal truth.
Hence, terms like ‘literal truth,’
‘objective,’ ‘subjective,’ ‘metaphorical,’ and the like make sense
only when used within the bounds of the two kinds of metaphor,
“dead” and “alive” referring to predictable publicly recurrent
perceptions and denied to language of conceptions relating to claims unrelated
to such perceptions.
If one accepts that the language of our perceptions
and of science is metaphor, then logic dictates that the language of
hypostatized theistic abstractions is twice metaphor, and twice nonobjective not
to mention guilty of the fallacy of begging the question as indicated above.
It is worth repeating here, if one assumes there is no evidence as to
why we believe there is a universe beyond our perceptions, possesses and
expresses no curiosity about the possibility for it, one is not likely to seek,
or find, any.
It is imperative, therefore, to examine certain
linguistic usage and abuses if we are to seek evidence that might possibly
justify the common belief that there is a world beyond our perceptions.
This
calls upon us to do some nitpicking examinations of relevant terminology such as
“metaphysical,” “objective,” “nonobjective,” “metaphorical,” and
the like.
Importantly, we need to recognize that the term,
‘evidence,’ must not be conflated absolutely with the term, ‘empirically
physical,’ a term that has no referent in fact in our experience.
It is important that we make a linguistic
distinction about the term, ‘Subjectivity,’ because it is subject to
equivocation. All mental activity,
“privately belongs” to the entity in which the activity occurs.
Thus it is designated “Subjective” with a higher case “S.”
When mental activity occurs through the function of
our sense faculties, through which all perception is experienced, it is referred
to severally as “public,” “objective,” and “denotative.
Sometimes we designate this, in
error under these circumstances, as capital
letter “O.” When there is non-perceptive related mental activity severally
referred to as “individualized,” “private” and “conceptual” it is
designated to be “subjective”
with a lower case “s.”
This method of designation of our mental
activities, perceptive vs conceptive, is in need of revision. And just as there is a second order (small s)
subjectivism, there is another second order subjectivism designated with a small
letter “o” for “objectivism.”
There is no higher case letter ”o” because
there is only the conceptual “objectivism of a ding an sich.
In my view, however, such a term as “conceptual objectivism” is
typical of the way we abuse language giving the impression that such
nomenclature assures the ontological existence of the conceptual meanings
attributed to it.
I suggest that we designate the language we use to
refer to our perceptions of “physical things,” as first order metaphor
(higher case letter) “O” and non physical functions of our perceptions, such
as dancing, driving a car, talking, music, movement of the tree in the breeze,
use of language, and the like as second order metaphor (lower case letter
“o.”)
More accurately, however, our designations should
be S (perceptual and conceptual experiences), Ss (private experience), SO
(“public” experience), and So (public experience of functions of
“matter.” Conventionally,
however, they could be shortened to S,
s, O, and o.
Experience informs us that we are active in the
formation of many of our thoughts, particularly those not related to perceptions
or related to memories of our perceptions.
We perceive also, in the behavior of other people,
that they are having similar unwilled perceptions.
As to the perceptual meanings, consider the fact
that a perception is acquired despite willfulness of the perceiver if his sense
faculties are functioning well. We
have no willful control over what we will perceive, for instance, when we open
our eyes or when a sound wave impinges itself upon our inner eardrums.
Language describing such perceptions is considered to be public because countless
perceivers under the same circumstances will have similar, though not identical,
perceptions.
We do have willful control over concepts.
It requires, however, the will to exercise that control.
We have thoughts, stimulated it is scientifically, i.e., biologically,
determined, through our sense faculties and thoughts stimulated by the brain’s
mind alone, i.e., thoughts based on mental experiences no one else can have,
so-called extra sensory experts to the contrary.
With the former if we look in the direction of a tree, we have no choice
but to see it. With the latter,
though previous perceptions may somehow through memory or creative mental
activity underlie our thoughts, other than in dreams, we can choose to refrain
from thinking them.
Clearly, belief in an external world is accordingly
strongly justifiable unless one is solipsistic.
Moreover,
it is unlikely that of the billions of people on earth, not to mention
populations of the past and probably of the future, any normal thinking person
truly believes in solipsism or that he was not the issue of a physical mother
and father. Such a belief in the
face of perceptive evidence of the behavior or other people, separate but
similar to our own behavior, can hardly be equated by any clear thinking person
with belief for which there is and cannot be any verifiability.
Would the reverend deny the existence of evidence of any kind?
He does speak of individuated atoms having been proved (I assume he means
scientifically verified) or is he selective as to what he will or will not
accept as evidence?
For instance, if 100 people agree upon the fact
that they witnessed an accident
occur at a given moment, and at least most of the descriptions of it were
similar and if all of them showed photographs of the event they had taken
immediately after it occurred, to which one of those persons i.e.,
“perceptions,” all insisting they witnessed it, would you attribute to his
having only a perception of an event that did not actually occur but showed up
on 100 photographs -- and would you be arguing only with an uncaused perception
of someone arguing with you, i. e. with yourself?
Obviously such a seriously taken conclusion would
be the height of irrationality.
Whatever may be the nature of the universe our
perceptions are part of it, even if the only part of it.
Consequently, our problem is not whether there is a
universe but rather whether there is more to the universe than we now
experience. The same cannot
legitimately be claimed for the multiplicity of gods proclaimed to exist by
uninformed conditioned believers.
Moreover, there is clear evidence, that trillions of other life forms on this
earth have experiences radically different from ours.
Which "view" of
the assumed thing-in-itself is the accurate one?
I cannot help wondering how the reverend would
account for the fact that a new born child growing up in this world of only
perceptions experiences similar ones as those of, for instance, his
great-great-great-grandpa, long deceased, from whom generations of children
inherited the home and property, that are only perceptions, not to speak of
experiencing perceptions of the same far away places they both had visited over
the centuries.
Is a newborn child only a perception?
Does his being only a perception, ad infinitum, cause his perceptions, so
long as a human perception exists? Is there no external “world”
“causing” these complexes of perceptions?
In fact the reverend’s whole life is a testament
to the fact that he is more than just a perception particularly since so much of
his thought experiences have nothing to do with perceptions other than possibly
his thoughts creatively fashioned from memories of his life’s experiences.
But more than that he must wrestle with the
question, “To whom was he lecturing when he opined that there is no evidence
of a world beyond his perceptions. Surely it would make little sense to claim
that a first cause perception is the cause of all other
perceptions.
Having said that does not entitle us to say, “We know
objectively that there is a universe external to our perceptions.”
But, we are very much entitled to say, “We have
very good reasons, many of them of second order perceptions, i.e.,
"o," to believe that there is.”
However, to claim as some theists have, that God is
the first cause in the face of a total lack of any possible evidence, makes no
more sense than to claim that the universe is the first cause.
Not only do such claims ignore the principle of
parsimony but, they commit a host of other fallacies of reasoning.
If I may appeal to one myself, Aristotle, in
paraphrase, said, “Talk of beginnings and endings has no epistemic
significance.”
At least we know there is a universe, whatever its
nature may be and that it is a prerequisite, i.e., an "infinity" of
causes, however that phrase may be defined a la John Staurt Mill. To assume
that it was created out of nothing is sheer epistemic nonsense in
the face of evidence to the contrary.
We can play metaphoric linguistic games with the
term, “objectivity.” But no one should be fooled into conflating these games
with an ontological status of value beyond our perceptions, a verifiable
ontological status, or by such a status by any definition of the term,
‘ontology.’
The proper designation for such unfalsifiable
claims is not “non objectivity.”
“Rather, it is “epistemic nonsense.”
Strictly speaking it makes no sense to say, “Science is nonobjective.
Only an intelligent entity can be objective or nonobjective and express
those qualities through such language in its myriad complex forms.
This being the case, it is questionable as to
whether the reverend can get into the minds of every scientist to determine
whether or not thought is given to there being a physical world in the face of
the fact that all the successes in science have resulted whether there is an
absence of evidence of cause and effect -- or not.
Is it
not obvious that there is no similarity of beliefs -- or achievements -- from theism compared to
those of science -- even if a few "scientists" who were conditioned to
be theists, claim to have such beliefs? Isn’t that the
“proof of the pudding”?
And
speaking of metaphors, a few green apples in the barrel should not be conflated
with a whole barrel of red apples.
Never can the chasm between science and theism be
bridged.
SEE FILE 21: PERENNIAL QUESTIONS