FREE WILL
AND DETERMINISM
Updated October 2004 and 2007
In revisiting the issue of
free will and indeterminism
vs determinism, I am including much material from a lecture on "Karl
Popper's Indeterminism," I presented for the Long Island Philosophical
Society, (under the title, Commentary on Ellen Katz's "'Of Clouds and
Clocks' Revisited"), Saturday, April 7, 1984 at the State University of New
York Agricultural and Technical College at Farmingdale. I realize that I am attempting a task already addressed by a
multitude of philosophers. It is through the study of some of their works that I
hope to show that much disagreement is caused by our abuse of language, a
subject that I did not address at that time, particularly lending ontological status to abstract terms, (recognized in
discursive logic as "the fallacy of hypostatization"). In attempting
to clarify our uses of the term 'free will,' I hope to crystallize the pros and
cons of the argument and to further the understanding that the concept that the
universe is partly indeterminate is without merit.
Albert Einstein offers us
a clear and succinct description of the issue:
The universe of ideas is just as little independent of the nature of our experiences as clothes are of the form of the human body.
And John Staurt Mill:
The question whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy concerning the freedom of the will; which, from at least as far back as the time of Pelagius, has divided both the philosophical and the religious world. The affirmative opinion is commonly called the doctrine of necessity, as asserting human volitions and actions to be necessary and inevitable. The negative maintains that the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by antecedents, but determines itself; that our volitions are not, properly speaking, the effects of cause, or at least have no causes which they uniformly and implicitly obey. (1)
Experience, if we are
not to doubt it, shows that an organism behaves in a manner quite dependent upon
its environment, heredity, and in the case of human beings, his physical
constitution and upbringing.
There is no doubt that
human beings possess free will. It is necessary if a code of ethics and
responsibility is to be maintained. However, what the indeterminist means by the
term differs from that of the determinist. As well as that, the indeterministic
free will is not compatible with our reasoning processes. Because of these
dualistic interpretations not only of the term 'free will' but also of such terms
as 'chance,' 'cause,' 'will,' 'self,' 'responsibility,' 'ability,' and others
much unnecessary confusion arises.
It seems likely, as Hume
and Mill, and many others have stated, that if common definitions were agreed
upon, there would be much less confusion. There is, however, more to the issue
than agreement of definition. With the advent of quantum theory and the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, other questions arose threatening to undermine
the doctrine of determinism unless predictions could be shown to be possible
within the former.
A further word of
caution:
In a subject such as this, how we use and abuse language is a serious concern.
Too often, little consideration is given to our shifts of levels of language.
It
is an unfortunate characteristic of language, also, that we so often resort to
colloquial, conventional, stipulated, metaphysical, academic, and obscure use of
terminology. It is the responsibility of the reader to discern those uses if he
is to weed out the nonsense so often foisted upon us.
On the one hand, the
indeterminist believes, erroneously, that if determinism were true, man would
lose his dignity and significance. The determinist, on the other hand, claims
that if indeterminism were true, there would be no sense to man's ambitions and
planned living inasmuch as free action could upset and destroy everything at any
moment. He claims too as Mill points out
My suspicion is,
rather, that the concept of free will evolved in the minds of theists to take
their omni-beneficent, omnipotent, and omniscient gods off the hook for the ills,
misery, harm, pain, immorality, suffering, and the like that are rampant in the
world.
The solutions to these
problems lie in the fact that the sciences are predicated upon the concept of
determinism. Moreover, the rise of modern civilization owes its progress to it.
Those sciences which deal with human activity, such as psychology, ethics, economics, and history, are all compelled to assume, as the condition of their existence and progress, that the actions of men, highly complex and varied as they are, lie within the series of necessary relations. Walter Everett (3)
The interests of
science and morals demand that responsibility and freedom of will be compatible
with the doctrine of determinism. It is necessary for man to conform to moral
law and to retain a sense of responsibility and duty if we are to maintain a
civilized and progressive society, however imperfect it may be. And, as Everett points out,
The principle of necessary connection has been the guiding thread by which man has slowly escaped from many a fearsome labyrinth of error and superstition. (4)
If this compatibility
cannot be shown, the indeterminist will certainly have more than sufficient
reason to dissent to the opposite view. By the very nature of the doctrine of
determinism, it, in effect, declares that all acts of man, whether good or evil,
once committed, in actuality, were inevitable. Such a statement can and has led
to extreme misinterpretation. The indeterminist either can't or won't understand
that this inevitability involves understanding the whole of the doctrine of
determinism and not merely the idea, "it had to be."
The indeterminist readily
admits that for the most part, our universe does adhere to causal laws. But, his
doctrine of free will declares that there are some instances of human behavior
which cannot be construed as falling within the causal category.
Strange as it may seem, it
is possible for the determinist to agree to "freedom of will," without
undermining his position. To do so, however, requires us to recognize that a
person is a complex of internal and external streams of causes wherein they are
in a constant state of changes such that superficially, we're tempted to say
such things as, "He is not the kind of person to do the thing he did."
Apparently, at "that moment" he was.
It is apparent that the
indeterminist neglects to distinguish between a person and an inanimate object.
He either ignores, or is blind to the fact, that a person is capable of making
decisions and choices, all non-ontological functions, which constitute part of the causal system.
Man observes a
situation, weighs the alternatives, and arrives at a decision which ultimately
is determined by his nature and life's experiences. It is an error to think of
determinism in Hobbsian, i.e., merely in billiard-ball, terms.
Since everyone is born as
an uncivilized "person," moral laws were conceived and linguistically codified as tools for the purpose of
enabling us to evolve amicable relationships among ourselves. Such laws
undoubtedly were founded upon the natural love, care, and empathy expressed by
parenting, development of friendships, and interdependency, all of which must be
recognized as causes leading to effects.
But to interpret the issue of "free will and determinism" strictly in
causal terms without consideration of the fact the no linguistic symbol has an
inherent meaning is to miss the point entirely. "Cause" or any
of its possible synonyms, such as "force" or "compulsion"
and the like must be forsaken.
No
one is privy to the existence of physical causality. We are privy to our
perceptions and our linguistic expression of our experiences of those
perceptions and consequently conceptions. Hence, any attribution of
meaning to the term, 'cause,' must be examined within the bounds of usage and
levels of usage of language, not to some conceived ontology of cause.
Consider how constantly we
refer to our freedom of will on that level of language when we are not being
concerned with philosophical implications. That we make linguistic shifts
to alternative levels of usage of the term does not absolve us from the fact
that such shifts are still attributions of meanings that bring us no closer to
an ontological existence of "causes." David Hume had it right!
Consequently, to speak of
certain causes, such as making a choice predicated upon the weighing of evidence
and otherwise unrestrained, is a perfectly legitimate attribution of the
exercise of free will.
The indeterminist seems
not to be able to distinguish between unrestrained and restrained behavior.
For
instance, a person limits the use of alcoholic consumption because he wishes to
remain in control of his faculties. Even in an environment of social persuasion,
he is exercising his "free will" which is determined by his physical
and mental attributes. No one is forcing him to abstain, though at one party, he
may abstain and at another, he may imbibe. If he is unable to abstain, he is
"restrained" from doing so, i.e., determined by his addiction over
which he has no control.
The main point to be
emphasized is that man makes choices. Man is a complex of forces that underlie
the complex of causes and effects which, in turn, underlie his actions. Obviously there could be no choices made absent his brain and its functions.
Free will is the ability to
make choices. They are made because of antecedent events, many of which
are not physically ontological, not because of the
absence of them. Such choices, in the making, are brought into play by one or
more of the following: genes, instinct, habit, training, education, physical
constituents, and all the other qualities and character traits developed by the
past experiences of the individual. He feels free to choose as he wishes and
does choose as he wishes, all the competing "forces," i.e., causes,
many of which are manifested by some physically ontological entity,
considered. He, as that complex of "forces" is the "decider."
The indeterminist is
fooled into believing that some events have no antecedent causes because he
ignores or is ignorant of the fact that every effect is caused not by a single
cause but by a stream of
causes and because the proximate cause may be undetectable by his sense
faculties giving the impression that none exists.
William James's
"Dilemma Of Determinism" is a classic example of how far astray the
indeterminist can wander in an attempt to disprove determinism. At the very
outset of his essay, James declares:
I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove [verify?] to you that the freedom of the will is true. The most I hope is to induce some [?] of you to follow my own example in assuming it true and acting as if it were true. (5) [bold italics, mine]
One may believe that
freedom of will is true but how can one possibly act on the assumption of free
will?
As for an indeterminist
acting as if there is free will, he doesn't. His choices and actions are
conducted according to his history of experiences. If he honestly believes that
there are cases of behavior without antecedent events, he must surely experience
a thousand fears that his well-laid plans may at any moment be completely and
utterly destroyed by some uncaused act, on which all his training, heredity,
education, desires, and environment would have had no restraining effect.
However, it is apparent
that the indeterminists do not show the least fear that such might be the case.
And they might well have fear if they so believed, not only for their lives, but
for their sanity. There could be no reason not to fear that their
"next" acts might be abominable.
James attempts to clarify
his adherence to the concept of free will
James is setting up an
impossible and irrational self-admittedly "impossible hypothesis" and
expects a rational answer. For one, he neglects to indicate whether the
antecedents, i.e., the states of the alternative universes, before his decision,
are identical for each possible choice. However, if one were omniscient,
about the states of each of the alternative universes, one could show the connections
among all the events occurring, by "chance" or not, before the
decision, and could certainly predict the choice each would make.
He has given a case
neither for indeterminism nor against determinism.
He has shown us nothing
but a man walking down one street in one universe, and the same man down another
street in "another universe" at the same moment of time. From this we are to
infer that whichever one actually happened was not inevitable. He has given us
two isolated and unrelated events and asks us to pass a single judgment about
them.
It is impossible to make
inferences about any event unless there is a history of recurrence or knowledge
of its antecedents upon which we might make predictions. He has shown us in his
illustration his actions after the choice was made in his mind; but he has given
us no trace of his life's experiences or the workings of his brain before the
choice was formed. Knowledge of them would have enabled us to give him an
intelligible answer.
He admits, that he has
made choices. Admitting that much, can anyone sensibly deny that all the
qualities of his personality and past experience affected the making of those
choices? Would he have us believe that for an instant of time all his past lost
its power to effect his decisions, then after a choice was made (I know not
how), regained its power? Does he not ever allow the necessity of the existence
of his body, i.e., brain, without which a choice could not be made? To quote
James again, he claims,
Obviously James
disagrees with Poincare, who considers chance to be an "aggregate of
complex causes," William James declares non-inevitableness, i.e.,
"indeterminism is rightly described as chance." (8)
He also implies that the
universe could be what it is today even if "parts" of the universe had
never existed. "Parts," being complexes of causes and effects, of the
universe come into and out of existence constantly, thereby altering the state
of the universe from one nanosecond to another. It is never the same from one
nanosecond to another.
Considering James'
"will to believe," and if he truly believed such a possibility, I can
only ask is there some evidence that there has been at least one instance of
indeterminism in the history of the universe? Moreover, as Bertrand Russell once
asked, with tongue in cheek, I'm sure, in paraphrase, "What if God created
the universe as it exists today, two seconds ago?" Or, to paraphrase,
Bishop George Berkley asserted: All events are but perceptions of God; i.e.,
"to be is to be perceived. What of history then?
The indeterminist's
contention that there are cases of human behavior without behavioral events
being antecedently determined is a conviction derived from the belief that the
question of morals depends upon it. However, in his attempts to defend his
belief, he becomes enmeshed in ambiguity.
James declares that
determinists argue that if free will is true, anything that occurs, morally,
could just as probably occur immorally, for instance a person who commits a
saintly act could just as probably at that moment have committed a criminal act.
Surely, it makes no sense
to speak of probability in the absence of possibility. Nothing is probable
unless it is first possible. It follows, then that if it is possible it can be
so only through deterministic events. It makes no sense to speak of
possibilities emerging out of nothing, absent antecedent causes. It makes no
sense, for instance, to speak of the possibility of someone being killed without
some antecedent cause doing the killing. If that cause is a human being, his act
of killing and the victim being possible to be killed, had to be causes for the
killing to occur for whatever intentional or unintentional reason he may have
done so.
It would be convenient
indeed if a choice about history, or not, could be restricted to a moral
category. He declares of those (unpredictable) restricted alternatives that
there is a "chance" that any one of them is possible and that, on his
definition of chance, the one which was finally made need not have been
antecedently determined. Does he expect us to believe that after the will has
been tempted, it severs itself from these alternatives being a "free
will," and still having done that, commits only a moral or immoral act?
He wishes to have freedom
of choice, restrict it to moral alternatives and not have any one of them
inevitable after the will has been "tempted" by alternatives. Is it
not obvious that moral conduct, hence principles, evolved in the minds and
"hearts" (i.e., out of empathy), of human beings to enhance their
ability to live in peace with each other? James admits, indirectly, that the
final choice will have been motivated by one of the alternatives all of which
will have tempted our will. Surely a temptation which motivates an act is an
antecedent event. Consider the following quotation before we leave James.
James makes no
distinction between linguistically diminishing man and factually doing so.
He
declares that one ought to believe in free will because it "augments one's
dignity." Let reason and logic fly to the winds.
He would have us believe
it is not a necessary part of transmitting the past to become part of the
future. However, in the Dilemma of Determinism, he declares moral alternatives
tempt the will suggesting that the will acts according to those temptations.
James also takes the pragmatic view that since man's dignity is augmented by
some principle which is called "free will," man should believe in
it. Giving him the benefit of the doubt as to his meaning of "free
will,"
it does not follow that such "dignity" cannot be explained on the
basis of reason rather than being accepted blindly merely because dignity is a
good quality to possess. Nor is it the case that believing in a principle makes
it worth believing.
The indeterminist feels
that "new" events which he confines to human behavior can pop up out
of nowhere without any connection whatsoever with any previous events which have
occurred in the universe. To such a "feeling" there is little argument
I give besides showing the consequences (some of which I have already presented)
of the doctrine he "feels."
There is one thought,
however, the indeterminist might profit by to consider. There are well over six
billion inhabitants on this earth, many of whom are lacking not only in
education but also in a "high" order of intelligence. Each one of
these inhabitants has some degree of "feelings with concomitant
ideas." There's little doubt that many of these ideas would appear utterly
ridiculous even to an indeterminist. But if the indeterminist wishes his
"feelings" for his ideas to be accepted as proof of them, must he not
accept also the "feelings" of over six billion inhabitants of Earth as
proof of the veracity of their ideas no matter if they are contradictory --
Hitler's, for instance?
The progress of mankind
did not begin until feelings were tempered by reason and experience.
The Self Walter G. Everett, in
his Moral Values, offers his concept of what constitutes the self.
Is there a potential
self? Are there degrees of self? Fundamentally, Everett is saying the self
exists before it acquires consciousness and upon acquiring consciousness becomes
a "bundle of activities." He then segues into its origin and its
functions.
John Locke gives a rather
brief and to the point definition of the self:
I do not find either of
these concepts particularly clarifying. Such statements are open to various
arguments as to the nature and content of consciousness and whether there is a
self or potential self when one is in a coma or not conscious. Surely there
cannot be consciousness without content.
All the evidence available
to us, demonstrates clearly that if we were born and lived in different
countries and environments, that we could not possibly be the "selves"
that, each of us, is today, i.e, at any given moment. No two selves being the
same, the self is very definitely molded by its upbringing, its experience, its
behavior and activities, and psychic and emotional reactions to them, and by the
effects imposed upon it by its environment. In Platonic terms, it is in an
ever-continuing state of development, i.e., change, whether for "good"
or for "evil," and no two moments of selves are identical.
The self, i.e., the person
is an evolving functioning of a physical brain reacting to stimuli from its
environment developing all its acquired and inherited qualities and character in
action. He is the history of his life's experience beginning with his existence
in his mother's womb. If he is not forced to make a choice by threat of harm
and/or makes his choice after due deliberation of his own desires, he is
behaving as an individual who possesses a free will.
As for the role
consciousness, i.e., awareness, plays in the nature of the self, much depends
upon the physical aspect of our being.
First, according to
available evidence there must be some physical entity capable of being
conscious, and being in the presence of something to be conscious of or
something having been conscious of.
Second, no quantum or
individual particles of the brain, the complex from which consciousness
presumably emerges, is in itself conscious. Moreover, all matter reacts i.e., is
sensitive, to other matter. And just as the qualities and quantity of the two
gasses hydrogen and oxygen, combined under the right environment, to give
emergence to the quality of liquidity, so does rat consciousness, or cat
consciousness, or dog consciousness, with mere awareness, and ape consciousness,
or human consciousness, with awareness of awareness, emerge from the qualities
and quantity of the matter forming their separate brains.
However, since we are
interested in the self only insofar as whether it is caused or not or whether
"willing" is always caused by the self, I think it not necessary to
digress further.
For our purposes we shall
consider the self as Everett defines it:
Such statements amount
to saying that the self either has no cause, or once caused, severs itself from
its past history and creates its own causal energy, whatever he means by that,
whereby future acts may be committed. But how is it possible for the self to
sever itself from the history that precedes its emergence and still act as an
entity trained and educated in man's social world? And if the self were not
caused, from where did it come?
The indeterminist would
have us believe it originates its own activity. This infers that the self must
spring from nothing into the universe. And, despite an appeal to ignorance,
there is no evidence whatsoever from which we might infer that anything, not
alone the self, comes into existence from nothing. To separate the self from the
very properties and qualities from which it emerges makes no sense.
Will It is the will which
the indeterminists wish to prove is "free." Just what the will is is
not a clearly defined concept. Philosophers have yet to agree upon what it is,
not alone on what Immanual Kant meant by the use of the term.
However, it has been said
to be an "impulse," power, volition, energy which the indeterminist
declares to be free of antecedent determination after the self is in existence.
The term,
'will,' as with
all the other terms, is a hypostatized abstract term, used as if it has an
autonomous ontology separate from one's physical being and life experiences.
How can an
"impulse" have been unaffected by the history of the self when that
"impulse" acts in accordance with all the qualities of man's past
experiences? From where did the will acquire these qualities if it is
antecedently unaffected by the history of its self or of humankind. We are,
after all, herd animals.
Is not the will a complex
of ambition, desire to succeed, the need to satisfy curiosity, the desire to
create, and so much more? Is it not dependent upon the physical nature of a
human being subject to the nature of one's nutritional intake, physical
environment, chemistry of the brain, and many other factors too multitudinous to
cite here?
What does it mean, for
instance to say "I've lost the will to live other than to mean I do not
desire to continue living? Is "will" a noun or a verb. Is will an
entity or a function of the brain as is "liking," "hating,"
or "thinking," etc.? Does the will will or does the person will?
The answer is quite obvious. And the "person" is enabled to will only
through the physical being it inhabits as a result of his history of
experiences.
Consider William Cairns,
in his Moral Freedom, quoting Tappan,
How can one argue
against such linguistic nonsense? It seems the only possibility is to attack the
use of the term, 'will.' It is quite clear that intended is that the
will can and does spring out of nothing, and is a "thing of its own."
Yet, there is a contradiction in saying the human will was "made in the
likeness of the infinite will." "Made?" But as a first cause
uncaused? Moreover, what is the evidence for an "infinite will"; and
what is the nature of a will that is never ending? If one is willing to accept
"something appearing out of nothing," the will is postulated on
feeling, absent of any possible evidence.
Nothing is shown here, but
a parallelism of human will and Infinite Will, whatever that is. It has not been
shown that will is part of the infinite will or that there is any connection
except for similarity between them. Therefore, we have two first causes; one for
the infinite will and one for the human will. But the indeterminist allows for a
first cause for every act of willing. Here the human will has been defined to be
similar to the infinite will, but neither has been verified to have substantive
existence.
What we see is matter in
motion, i.e., spatio-temporal change. John Locke called the will
"power":
We won't consider
Locke's meaning of "mind" other than to say he considers it a "tabula
rasa," void of impression, as the "mind" of an unborn child prior
to the inception of experiences, in its mother's womb. Would it not be more
accurate to refer to the brain as the blank slate? If one can conceive
"power" not being exercised, we have Locke's will, which, to put in
other words, is merely the quality of "ableness" (the physicist might
call it potential energy).
This "power" is
comparable to "motion" in the respect that without physical objects
there can be neither. It is a quality discoverable only by making inferences
about physical bodies which are experienced (16) to be first in a state of
"inaction" and then in a state of interaction. Predictions of ableness
can then be made on the basis of such experiences.
"Willing" for
Locke is power or ableness being exercised (potential energy being
"changed" into kinetic energy for the physicist). This, I'm sure, all
will agree, is "energy in action" better said "physical bodies
interacting" inasmuch as numericalized "energy" is a mathematical
metaphor for quantifying a physical happening. Obviously, if a pure vacuum could
exist, one would find no energy inasmuch as, if we accept Einstein's equation:
energy equals mass times the speed of light squared, mass is a component of
energy.
"Willing in
action," an abstract idea, cannot be conceived other than as an interaction
of physical bodies. As such, I will combine the two (ability to interact and
interaction) into one and call it "will." No harm can be done by this
maneuver for "ability to interact" and "interaction" can be
interpreted as two states of the same "thing" (i.e., potential
interaction and active interaction.)
This then is the same
thing which is ascribed to the term, 'impulse.' But it is to be admitted that
this same thing is an abstract concept of force possessing no substantive
ontology, (i.e., interaction of physical objects). We must have some unambiguous
definition for the word we choose to use. Therefore, let us consider the will as
a force, and in so doing keep in mind the concept of force as put forth by Henri
Poincare and Lindsay and Marganau.
Poincare: "When we say force is the cause of motion, we talk metaphysics, and this definition, if one were content with it, would be absolutely sterile. For a definition to be of any use it must teach us to measure force; moreover that suffices; it is not at all necessary that it teach us what force is in itself, nor whether it is the cause or the effect of motion. (17)
It would be
linguistically cumbersome to put all abstract terms in quotation marks to
indicate that they name ideas only and not substantive ontology. Yet, they
should be so understood.
I suspect all will be
willing to admit that "force" is as fit a synonym for
"impulse," or "will" as any. At any rate it is certainly
less vague, for "force" has been defined within the sciences and
functions as a mental tool leading to predictable results, whereas the
"will" has been left as an unknowable and controversial concept.
It will be admitted too,
of necessity, that any discussion of the "will" entails the inclusion
of the physical phenomena from which the will must evolve and/or upon which the
will is said to exercise itself. Consequently, it makes no sense whatsoever to
speak of the will as a self-existent concept separate from physical phenomena as
many indeterminists are so wont to do.
Can there be
"motion," can there be "change" of appearance without
objects; or memory without a brain? Of course not, we declare impatiently.
We
should as impatiently declare the same of the will. If the will is an action, is
an "impulse," is a "force," a question, as intimated above,
arises. Does the will exist when there is no physical interaction? Of course, a
free willist will respond, "There is a potential will waiting to spring into
action." This, however, inspires more questions. Is the will lying dormant
somewhere in the brain or throughout the brain waiting to be awakened? And, what
causes the springing into action?"
I am compelled to answer
that this is a question of little value. One might as well ask what causes
sodium and water to react when they are in contact with each other. I do not
give the atomic theory as an answer because I assume that this is not the answer
the indeterminist would be seeking. Therefore, it is senseless to speak of will
as anything but an interaction or mutual attraction of the physical constituents
of our "selves."
Let us consider three
hypothetical human beings who are born each with the following physical
handicaps: the first is born deaf; the second deaf and blind; and the third is
born blind, deaf, and devoid of the sense of touch as not to be able to make
distinguishable contacts with the physical world. Would anyone affirm that the
power of their "wills" could be comparable to the "norm"?
The first could not
perceive or conceive sound. The second would have a "will" which would
not concern itself with appearance of objects except for bare geometrical forms
which would be discoverable only through his sense of touch and a form of
direction which could not be similar to ours. His "idea" of direction,
so far as the forms of physical objects are concerned, would be conceived in
terms of his sensations and memory of actual contact with each part of the
objects he experienced. His "will" would never have to (and could not)
consider values of color, visible or audible beauty, etc. He just would not have
had such "sensations" because of his physical handicaps. It is hardly
necessary to go to the third individual.
Our "wills" are
only a state of interaction of our physical structure which has achieved a
particular state of development. When we speak of the will being caused, we mean
the interaction of our physical parts has been antecedently determined by
interaction; (1) with environment (by environment I include all social order,
convention, moral motives, etc.) and (2) within and by the physical particles
which constitute us as human beings. Surely human will (or self), if there is no
human body, offers no qualities or character traits being "causes"
inasmuch as these are but results of the state of development of our physical
parts.
Such a concept as this
will bring fast on our heels the argument of moral consequences.
Morality
The indeterminist
achieving little success in disproving the doctrine of determinism through the
use of logic turns to the argument of consequences. He cannot reconcile himself
with the fact of determinism despite experience and logic. His favorite
arguments equate determinism with fatalism. It deprives us, he declares, of the
desire to progress, robs us of responsibility, paralyzes our moral efforts,
makes us no more than cogs in a huge machine making our systems of punishment
for evil and praises for good all wrong. Since our actions are inevitable, we
cannot but feel like hopeless puppets knowing our acts are products of heredity
and circumstances.
Fatalism is the
doctrine which ignores the will of the self completely and declares that no
matter what our choices may be in the future, the ultimate end will be the same.
In simple terms, we will have supper without choosing to prepare for it.
On the face of it alone,
this is a disingenuous argument and flies in the face of facts. When we make a
choice, the effect of that choice has always been a result of the choice. Had we
made a different choice, the effect would have been different. It is the choice
that "caused" the effect (bearing in mind, of course, that
"choice," stemming from physicality, has no physically ontological
status itself.
The indeterminist does not
recognize that his unrestrained choices of action are part of the inevitability
which goes into the making of future events. The ultimate end is inevitable only
on condition of the behavior of the self and will. The ultimate end will be one
of the many ends. Which one it will be depends upon the individual's behavior as
well as circumstances. What the individual's actions will be depends upon his
past history.
No effect is caused by
only the proximate cause. Every effect brought into existence is caused by a
stream of causes wherein each effect, in turn, becomes a cause.
Life, which is an effect
caused also by many streams of causes, is like a maze of passages with many
outlets with different "rewards" to be received at the end of each
outlet. Which reward is received depends upon choice of passages. The
determinist recognizes, as the fatalist does not, that the ultimate end can be
decided only by the choice of action for the future. The self and the will enter
into the causal stream.
The determinist believes
that the self as action of its physical counterparts is a great and active
factor in developing human life, and for those individuals who are inherently
ambitious and striving, even a belief in fatalism would not and could not swerve
them from their making unrestrained choices.
The indeterminist holds
that if determinism is true, we can have no hope of ever ridding ourselves of
the evils of the world order. But, such order is the case in any existing
doctrine of human behavior. The theist argues that God gave us free will so that
we can choose good over evil and accuses the determinist of stripping man of
responsibility for his own acts.
Assuming such an
accusation to be true, can it not be shown as readily that a supernatural being
(i.e., the Biblical god) who is responsible for the creation of the universe
has, by example, put the ability to be evil in man and created even the laws by
which the brain functions?
According to the Bible,
God, displeased with His human subjects' behavior, was the Father (or Mother) of
all mass murderers when He cast a world-wide flood upon us for 40 days and
nights proposing to rid Earth of all human life except that of Noah, his family,
and their cargo. Surely there were other good people besides Noah and his
family!
Must or can man be
responsible for His Acts? Such a Creator bathed the world in evil. Being
omnipotent, He could have created it absent of evil without denying us freedom
of choice; and if He felt we must know the difference between good and evil, one
very small example of evil would have sufficed to teach us that difference.
But,
let us consider a non-theistic point of view by John Stuart Mill.
The indeterminist
certainly should be the first to realize that his very own doctrine of free will
strips man of responsibility. How could a sane man rightfully be held
responsible for an act of evil the willing of which either suddenly popped up
from nowhere or was caused by the "causal energy within the self,
unantecedently determined outside the self," whatever that may mean. Such
an act entailing responsibility would have to be premeditated, and premeditation
is possible only under the deterministic view where all the acquired qualities
of character developed through a life of experiences would come into play.
As
Walter Everett explains:
It is because of this
habit-forming trait, and the memory of past acts that man is able to improve and
restrict his actions to the conventional moral laws of society. The explanation
of the method (determinism) by which human life has mentally and physically
developed does not alter one iota its intrinsic worth, beauty or dignity. All of
us are not one wit different -- the base are no less base and the good no less
good.
If and when a base
individual learns the value of good moral behavior, he may regret his past evil
actions. Such regret will be a causal factor in the developing of his future
moral actions.
Another argument the
indeterminist is quick to present is that since all acts of man are inevitable,
it is useless to punish him for his evil actions inasmuch as he was not
responsible for those actions. It may be true that man's actions once committed
were inevitable but when they are the result of willful choices, he is not
absolved from being responsible for them.
What is determined to be
good or evil is a matter of judgment not only on the part of individuals and
multitudinous religious institutions but particularly the evolution of societal
mores. Part of the stream of inevitability is made up of man's education,
training and evolution of ideas as well as environment and heredity. Moreover,
he is quite aware of the demands of society upon him and the consequences to be
felt should he ignore them.
Most human beings prefer
to act so as not to bring condemnation or punishment upon them. Man does not
lose his judgment or his idea of values no matter under what doctrine his
behavior is postulated.
This principle applies to
members of criminal organizations as well as in normal society. There must be
honor among thieves also. It is for this very reason that the
"utility" of punishment is not negated. Though "right" and
"wrong" have no ontological status, man still has his feelings of
right and wrong despite much disagreement about the nature of them. Such
feelings are part of the causal stream. Regret and also punishment are causes
for future behavior. Punishment may fail, however, with those persons who are
not what we call "normal."
In severe cases of wrong
doers undergoing measures, such as a lobotomy or psychiatric
treatment, might be more corrective than punishment.
Whether the behavior will
be bad or good depends upon not only the punishment inflicted and/or the regret
felt but also upon many other causal factors such as those that carry the most
weight.
Along with this,
punishment is more than just a tool to be used for the purpose of teaching moral
values. It is a system of protection for society whereby it attempts to isolate
in one fashion or another any and all those who intentionally do, intend to do,
or can do harm to other members of society.
Only a will which is
antecedently determined can be affected by such punishment or reward as is given
for corrective purposes.
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle With the advent of the
Quantum Theory, it was first thought that a case could be shown against the
doctrine of determinism.
However, as we shall see,
further searching into the theory has shown that no such hope for the
indeterminist is justified.
In order to predict the
future behavior of any particle it would be necessary to know the velocity and
position in space of each particle at a given time. But as Lindsey and Morganau
show, this is impossible.
As the argument goes:
"Since the knowledge of position at a given time is destroyed in
determining the velocity, and since velocity is altered in determining the
position, it will be forever an impossibility to uphold the doctrine of
determinism." Such a remark is easily refuted with a simple but adequate
example.
When a balloon is inflated
with air, there is no difficulty in making a fairly accurate prediction of its
behavior. We need not know the velocity or position either, of each molecule of
air being inserted or of each molecule of the rubber of which the balloon is
made. Experience has shown that the theory of aggregates leads to a satisfactory
degree of prediction in dealing with these molecules as classes rather than as
individual units. Aside from this, there is much to be said about the above
quotation.
Exactly what kind of
evidence does one have in mind when inferring that "it will forever be an
impossibility to uphold determinism"? To begin with, it must first be
stated, to quote Ernest Nagel,
In other words, all
knowledge being predicated upon some assumption, is expressed in language and is
not absolute, according to available evidence. Knowledge necessarily bares the
characteristic of probability only. Moreover, considering Einstein's
non-simultaneity of time (a questionable concept since it is relevant to
perceptions not to reality) and the fact that nothing is in a state of rest, all
claims to time and position are linguistic and not absolute fact.
Therefore, it is necessary
to consider the question in its physical aspects if we are to make a useful
analysis of the problem. Consequently, when we consider the "law of
causality" (determinism) we are compelled to interpret the concept 'law' in
a physical sense. However, again from Lindsey and Morganau,
It is found that physics knows of no law connecting cause and effect; indeed there is no plausible way of defining these concepts . . . there is no law of connection between cause and effect known to science; these concepts are foreign to physical analysis. Nor is it of any avail to inject them externally, for the meaning usually conveyed by the words in question is expressed more adequately and precisely by technical terms like boundary condition, initial and final state. (24)
Consider, also, this
from Poincare,
Allowing for Poincare
meaning we can never know absolutely, taken literally, we can be absolutely
certain, to an extremely high probability, but very wrong. Lindsey and Morganau
suggest,
Bare in mind, considering that "scientific knowledge" and human
ability are always expressed in terms of man's language of perceptions
of a presumed physical universe, this casts much doubt about whether
any expressions of the nature of "cause" can be justified in terms
of a physical reality and, therefore, must be interpreted within the bounds of
the "uses" of language.
Let us return to the
issue of the impossibility of determining the position and velocity of the
particles sufficiently to consider it proof of the validity of the doctrine of
causality. Such a concept arises from carrying the definition of
"states" in relation to classical mechanics over into the quantum
theory. It is certainly permissible to retain this definition but only with the
provision that when causality is discussed in relation to this definition that
it be understood that the reference is applicable only to the Positivistic
formulation, i.e., language, of causality.
Since the
"states" in classical mechanics are given in terms of positions and
momenta of particles, it is not at all permissible to pass judgment on the
causality question by showing that "causality" breaks down when these
states are shown not to be discoverable or predictable when applied to quantum
mechanics. A hypothesis is not invalidated merely because of the incapacity of
man to show proof for it if progress, which otherwise would not be made, can be
made by assuming the hypothesis to be true.
Of course, also not to be
ignored, are our webs of belief and dependence upon language, whether
mathematical or other, that affect which concepts of causality we have in mind
as -- John Staurt Mill delineated and distinguished in his laws of experimental
agreement: the methods of 1) agreement, 2) difference, 3) residues, 4)
concomitant variations, and 5) agreement and difference.
Moreover, when we discuss
quantum mechanics, it is necessary to recognize that "states" within
this theory are not at all the same as "states" in the classical
sense.
It can be shown that
quantum mechanical states are predictable (based on the knowledge of present
states) and the causality principle is valid if we agree to recognize these
states as probability and transformation functions.
It is the
indeterminist's failure to understand that the principle of determinism is the
linguistic description of nature and is explainable by science in descriptive
laws either verbally or mathematically (the latter more meaningfully) according
to the need.
If they would not
wrongfully read into this doctrine an inference of "compulsion," but,
rather, read it as undeviating concomitant events, bearing in mind that not all
concomitant events have necessary causal connections, witness the fact that
night follows day and vice versa, they would understand the role that our
"will," (our "selves") plays in this "fact of
life."
If they would think as
they tacitly act, "deterministically," if they could understand that
morality does not exist in a vacuum and is part of this descriptive doctrine, if
they would hold themselves responsible for making questionable metaphysical
statements and concepts such as non-physical entities and principles activating
the physical world, and, lastly, if they would logically and scientifically
(since they except science in most other respects) analyze their own doctrine,
it would be inevitable that they see where their doctrine of indeterminism
fails.
Such a statement, baring a
touch of tautology, would seem to beg the question. However, it is meant to
convey the idea that the indeterminist talks more than he thinks and once having
set up his doctrine, makes weak excuses for its failures rather than admit them.
Most important of all, he
fails to see the necessity for a means of explanation or description which
entails none of the emotive qualities that so many words carry -- this is
possible to the highest degree only within the sciences and mathematics.
To
settle such a question once and for all, the indeterminist must be brought into
the "laboratories" and to an understanding of the language of Science.
What we must not ignore is the metaphorical character of language inasmuch as
all language of knowledge and truth is perceptively oriented and probable at
best. Moreover, since every
declarative claim to truth and knowledge is preceded by an unspoken “if,” or
“according to available evidence,” it is incumbent upon us to take heed of
some admonitions worth repeating here.
It is found that physics knows of no law connecting cause and effect; indeed
there is no plausible way of
defining these concepts . . . there is no law of connection between cause and effect known to science; these
concepts are foreign to physical analysis. Nor is it of any avail to inject them externally, for the meaning usually
conveyed by the words in question is expressed more adequately and precisely by technical terms like boundary,
condition, initial and final state. Lindsey and Morganau
Of course, also not to be ignored, are our webs of belief and dependence upon
language, whether mathematical or other, that affect which concepts of causality
we have in mind as delineated and distinguished in his laws
of experimental agreement: the methods of 1) agreement, 2) difference, 3)
residues, 4) concomitant variations, and 5) agreement and difference by John
Stuart Mill.
These in turn must take into account our shifts of levels, i.e., contexts, of
language including conventional and colloquial usage.
Moreover, we must recognize the legitimacy of different attributions of
meanings, of the term, ‘cause,’ within those contexts
It would appear, then, that whatever we might deduce about causality on the
"infinitesimal level," or any level for that matter, it may or may not
have anything to do with the reality of events in the universe.
Since we can only conjecture, postulate, speculate, axiomatize, construct,
formulate, deduce, and theorize, and since mathematical precision is only
hypothetical precision until such precision is measured against empirical data,
it does not matter whether we are able to specify or measure precisely whether
events are uncaused on the infinitesimal level in the domain of sub-quark energy
levels. The conclusion may or may not fit the facts of the universe.
Though there may appear to be a direct correlation between subjective
probability and objective probability, if there is in fact such a thing, in the
macroscopic world, there is little if any evidence that such a correlation
exists on infinitesimal levels of energy.
The probability of events occurring without antecedent causes is a domain
of human thought. Nowhere in the experience of man has there been
empirical evidence of objective probability.
To claim otherwise is a case of unfalsifiability.
In all probability, the concept of indeterminism was born out of and borne by
the forces of theism which were concerned with defending their gods against the
charge of creating and permitting evil. God is presumed to have given man
a free will. With this free will, man is supposed to have escaped being
totally subject to God's laws of morality and consequently is guilty of choosing
freely to commit evil.
Since
the introduction of the term 'free will' into man's vocabulary, there has been
an unceasing but unsuccessful effort to prove the existence of events without
antecedent causes. If such efforts could be shown to be successful then,
obviously, to take an example, the catastrophic
socio-politico-economic-religious physical event of the destruction of six
million Jews is the result of the uncaused free will of Hitler and his minions.
Apparently the infinitesimal levels of energy of the neural activity in which
the events without antecedent causes occurred are the source of that free will.
Are we to assume then that none of the caused events which occurred on the
energy levels of neuronal activity going on in the brains of Hitler and his
minions causally added up to the macroscopic events of the holocaust?
That
there may have been a relatively miniscule number of events without antecedent
causes in a universe where experience supported by scientific knowledge tells us
that the predominance of events does have antecedent causes is of small
consequence in determining whether the universe is deterministic. This
particularly applies to the concept of indeterminism for which there has never
been any empirical evidence. Man is a complex of internal competing forces
reacting to the forces of his environment. It would appear, then, that the
experiences of man, the events of the world, and the processes and methods of
science, probabilistic in every case, all attest to a causal sequence of events,
viz., a deterministic universe.
But assuming we could verify the
existence of causes, it is not a legitimate argument to say that because the
universe is deterministic that we are not free to make choices anymore than it
would be fair to say that we are not free to speculate, to analyze, to create,
to inquire, to reflect, to observe, etc., qualities of the mind that many people
do not choose to exercise of even give any thought to exercising.
More than that, those who deny the
attribution of “free will” to the term, ‘free will,’ apparently are
ignorant of or are failing to recognize the concept of emergence as related to
causality. Such emergence, new or
recurrent, is a ubiquitous and permeative outcome of the presumed causal nature
of all existence and just as Kant proclaimed existence as a prerequisite for the
exercise of qualities, so too is cause, whatever its form, a prerequisite for
the continued emergence of those qualities for the simple reason that there
cannot be physical existence in the absence of cause or vice versa; that is to
say, existence and the specific nature of the existents are causes
themselves. And inasmuch as emergence is a permeative process, if a universe is to
exist, no emergent comes into existence absent “caused” qualities.
For without causes that combination and amount of matter that gave
emergence to free will in such a small amount of matter of human brains could
not have occurred.
Given the evidence of our experiences despite the variety of our interpretations
of them, the idea of existence absent causality makes no sense.
As Einstein so aptly observed,
"The universe of ideas is just as little independent of the nature of our
experiences as clothes are of the form of the human body."
If language has any positive value, it is the instrument for expressing out
interpretations of our experiences.
Who can legitimately deny that
experience repeatedly verifies that human beings are capable of making
unrestrained choices?
The universe is composed of a diversity of emergent forms of matter.
One of those emergents is the human brain giving way through millions of
evolutionary processes to other emergent qualities such as life, mind, and all
the qualities of mind that constitute what we call human intelligence.
Such emergent qualities include not only awareness of our awareness,
curiosity, the ability to abstract, to symbolize, to refer, to infer, to
speculate and a host of other qualities designated to be human.
Out of the almost infinite various kinds of physicality in the universe, some
infinitesimal part of it gives emergence to various mental qualities designated as human
emerging from a specific kind and quantity of matter -- a brain.
Among those qualities emerged the ability to make choices.
That emergent ability is free will.
Isn't it clear that the
unrestrained choices of human beings are made because of the
deterministic processes that gave emergence to that ability?
What is there about
"unrestrained choices" one does not understand?
Free
will, then defined as the ability to make choices, is a quality emerging from
causalities, whatever their nature.
‘Free
will’ is a term that clearly distinguishes an attribute, perceptively
distinguishable from restrained and compelled choices
The
error in denying free will lies in how we define indeterminism and determinism.
If instead we used the terms, ‘cause,’ and ‘absence of cause,’ we
would notice immediately that there need not be and in fact there is no antipathy between the terms,
‘free will,’ and ‘cause.’
An apparent lack of causality is a metaphor, for there is no such kind of
existent. Our
problem is conceiving the term, ‘cause,’ as a push or pull, or exertion of
energy that David Hume clearly showed there had no possibility of being
verified.
The
error in arguing that the ”will,” i.e., the person is not free because its
choices are “caused,” by an “infinite” stream of causes not clearly
defined or possibly even able to be, i.e., determined, lies in the misuse of the
term, ‘cause,’ or misinterpretation of the meaning or meanings of
“cause” or in a refusal to recognize its justifiable use in a particular
linguistic context.
Like
a recalcitrant eddy breaking off from the main stream of causes to form its own
unique stream of causes giving emergence of an entity capable of making choices,
the following stream of causes, i.e., the person, having acquired distinctly
different attributes, distinguishes itself markedly by overriding and replacing
the antecedent stream of causes.
Hence
the fact of free will, as a form of adjunct or cause, by its very nature of
being distinct and different from other antecedent causes requires that that
difference be clearly codified and identified with the term, ‘free will’ in
the science of lexicology.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1) John Stuart Mill, "System of Logic,"
Chap. 11, Of liberty and Necessity.
2) Ibid. Pp, 521-522.
3) Walter Everett, "Moral Values," Ethical
Interpretation of Freedom. P. 337.
4) Ibid. P. 342.
5) William James, "The dilemma Of Determinism, Will
To Believe. P. 146.
6) Ibid. Pp. 155-156.
7) Ibid. p. 159.
8) Ibid. P. 159.
9) William James, Lowell Lectures, Pragmatism, pp.115-
129-20 cf. 116.
10) Walter G. Everett, Moral values, pp. 349-350.
11) John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
II, XXVII, 17.
12) Everett, Ibid., p. 350.
13) Everett, Moral Issues, p. 349. (Cf. Calderwood,
Handbook of Moral Philosophy. P. 186.
14) Tappan, Review by Edwards in Willian Cairn's, Moral
Freedom. P. 223.
15) Locke, Ibid., Chap. XXI, p. 131.
16) By experience in general, I mean an interaction of
our physical parts with our environment. Our physical parts are then altered and
developed and react with environment with the future according to their past
interactions.
17) Poincare, Foundations of Science, Chap. VI, p.98.
18) Lindsey & Morganau, Foundations of Physics, p.
96. Physical as an adjective here qualifies ideas, etc., as conceived by the
science of Physics. See pages 2 and 3.
19) Everett, Ibid., p. 364.
20) Mill, "Nature," Ibid., pp. 28-29.
21) Everett, Ibid., p. 366.
22) Lindsey & Morganau, Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 420.
23) Ernest Nagel, Principles of The Theory of
Probability, Vol., 1, p. 25, No. 6.
24) Lindsey & Morganau, Ibid., Chap. X, p. 517.
25) Poincare, Ibid.,
p. XI, p. 155.
26) Lindsey & Morganau, Ibid., p.521.
27) Ibid., p. 402.
28) Nagel, Ibid., p. 26.