LEIBNITZ'S
MONAD
Introduction
The philosophers of the 17th century had inherited
from the scholastics a concept of substance which required reformulation if it
were to fit into the world scheme of Newtonian Science, which had constructed or
described the universe in terms of a set of mathematical principles. These
principles applied to every material particle in the universe, regardless of its
size, mass, motion, or position in space. The problem with these principles was
that they could not explain the source and nature of our experiences.
The mechanical
"world-scheme" and its processes are described solely in terms of
particles of matter in motion, each particle determining the role of the others
by sheer mechanical causation. It would seem to be quite natural that
philosophers holding these views would fit all their concepts into this
underlying system and this would include concepts of society and governments.
Such an interpretation demanded a new understanding of man in his relation to
the world and to his fellowman. With the new science, man was to be described in
terms of the world. And it was the self-appointed task of Hobbes and Locke to
relate man to Newton's new mechanical-driven world now that it had been
renovated with concepts, like mass, energy, time, space, instead of the older
concepts of substance, essence, form, and quality.
These were the problems met
by Spinoza and Leibniz in the philosophical systems of their times. Once the
basic assumptions of how substance is going to be defined is granted, Descartes dualistic difficulty is successfully resolved,
and we have nature back
with us as she always was. But, we may ask, on what basis could such assumptions
be justified? If Descartes' innate and apriori ideas are denied, as Locke and
the later empiricists insisted they should be, then much as we might have, in
Spinoza and Leibniz, a resolution of Decartes' dualism problem, we cannot be
sure it is the true solution. Their concepts of substance and pre-established
harmony (respectively) fit nicely into their systems. But, if we should deny the
validity of these basic concepts and should subject them first to empirical as
well as rational tests, we should find that their systems were not altogether,
if at all, on firm ground. Experience and reasoning are the only valid criteria
to be used in discovering the nature of reality -- if any claim to knowledge of
reality is itself a valid one.
Even though the Monad is
considered the least important concept in Leibniz's philosophy, it is very
important to his system. For that reason, it is worth examining its relation and
significance to the problems that Leibniz felt Spinoza and Descartes to have
left unsolved.
In any event, this trio,
the continental titans of reason, was reared in an atmosphere and environment
of mathematics and science. It was a period when science was beginning to dig
its way up through the pressures and repressions of the dogmas and authority of
the organized church. They could not help but be influenced by the sciences and
mathematics in which they were all schooled. To what extent they were influenced
is shown in the systems of philosophy each developed.
The introduction of the
Monad, as Leibniz conceived it, is a direct result of his disagreement with
Descartes and Spinoza. Their concepts of reality, he thought, held several
glaring weaknesses.
Leibniz could not agree
with Spinoza's contention that it is the nature of reality to exhibit itself as
it does, i.e., in a sequential order. He contended that this did not answer the
question of what nature is. Moreover Spinoza contributed nothing to the solution
of the mind-body problem that was raised by Descartes. Descartes, himself,
failed to solve it too, having founded his philosophy so much on his rejection
of mechanical causation.
Master that he was, he
might have been more if he had had the courage to stand by his method of reason
wherever it might have led him. He did not want to incur the wrath of the clergy
and declared he would change his own ideas rather than try to change the world.
(1) Of necessity, he exercised caution which, I feel, created a drag on
his philosophic thinking.
But I shall refrain from
further criticism for the moment until we have some idea of what it is to be
levied at. Therefore, it is necessary that we examine some of the fundamental
disagreements he had with Descartes and Spinoza.
Rene Descartes
Descartes's
dualism, was inherent in nature, itself, raising the difficult problem of
finding just where and how the extended and thinking substances are related.
It
is obvious that they are. Otherwise, why should the world operate so
harmoniously? Why, when we experience one object hitting another, is the formula
that expresses that phenomenon being exemplified?
Descartes, rejecting
completely the principles of empiricism as a method of understanding nature, (2)
attempted to deduce the structure of the universe through reason. But, with the
inception of the concepts of substance, thought, space, and infinity, he
slighted reason in favor of apriori "knowledge." He did not really
dispense with reason, however, for he contended that knowledge was given by
clear vision of the intellect. (3) This "clear" vision was possible
because the mind possessed certain innate ideas.
On the basis of an implied
assumption that the mind knows its own processes, i.e., that he knows the mind
thinks, Descartes arrived at his famous dictum, "I think, hence, I
am." (4) Despite the hidden circularity of his statement, he never doubted
this for a moment. Man, being a rational animal, can come to know this
intelligible structure through the intellect that possesses two functional logical
distinctions: active and passive. This, of course led eventually to a dualism of mind
and body for the mind knows its own processes better than it knows the objects
it thinks about. It was a dualism he was never to solve--however assiduously he
tried.
When confronted with the
problem, he attempted to solve it by first proving the existence of God, which
he did to his own satisfaction, with a version of St. Anselm's Ontological
proof, i.e., that God's perfection logically entails existence. (5) Having
proved, but not verified, the existence of God, he credited Him with having
created the two "substances," thinking and extension, (6) out of which
the universe, he contended, is constructed. But God, Himself, is Pure Infinite
Substance, and it is through God that matter receives its attribute of
extension, and its attribute of thought, i.e., mind. These are the only
attributes, says Spinoza, later, that the human mind can know.
Descartes, prone to the
logic of mathematics, postulated two kinds of substances, separate and distinct
from one another, because he was unable to account for what, later, Locke
distinguished as primary and secondary qualities, i.e., the attributes of the
physical world subject to geometric explanation. Attributes of the extended
substance, matter, were the primary qualities, with which the new science
concerned itself. Its character was of a geometric nature as opposed to our
experiences, the content of consciousness, mind, i.e., colors, sounds, tastes,
etc. These he could not describe in quantitative terms.
Underlying both of these
substances is the One Perfect Substance, God, the explanatory principle for the
apparent harmony existing between the extended and mental substances.
However, Descartes insisted
that the mind was wholly distinct from the body. (7) It was only an apparent
connective relationship because God, in his benevolence, synchronized the mental
and bodily events. This synchronization depends upon the constant intervention
of God. (8) Nothing can exist without it.(9)
This was not a satisfactory
answer for Descartes' dictum, "Je pense, donc je suis," by which, he
though he had proved his own existence. Not realizing it, at least initially, he
implied an interaction of the substance doing the thinking, with the substance
of his physical being.
If Descartes
were not to be
found guilty of circular reasoning leading to a contradiction, he would have to
have another answer. He did. Without recognizing the weakness of his argument,
he declared that the soul rests in the pineal gland and functions as a catalyst
directing the course of the movement of the blood through the body activating
the muscles. (10)
But how can the mind, i.e.,
functions of a physical brain, cause any physical action? Evidence clearly shows
that non-matter is absent of causal abilities. Descartes never devised a
credible answer. But if he did not solve the question, he must receive credit
for having motivated those who followed him to pursue it
Benedict Spinoza
Spinoza
could not accept Descartes' solution in which the two substances were related.
For Spinoza, the intelligibility of the world structure takes the form of a
universal cosmic law, a mathematical and logical order. The whole of nature is
intelligible in itself and all intelligibility follows the order of nature.
Common to Spinoza and Leibniz is the Aristotelian concept that substance
contains within itself, inseparately, form and matter, i.e., the idea that
nature is, and that it is intelligible in terms of a unified logical structure.
That is to say, Spinoza translated Descartes' double concept of nature, mind,
and extension, into the effort to avoid the dualism by combining in substance,
itself, not only its material existence but the causes, forms, or intelligible
structure as well. Spinoza made the order of ideas coextensive with the order of
nature. Every extension has a correlative idea. That is, extension and thought
are two attributes of substance that has infinite attributes none
of which can be known except the two mentioned. Thus when Spinoza considers the
world intelligible experientially and mathematically, he is positing two aspects
or attributes in which the world, the one substance, can be known.
As with Plato, Spinoza
felt, so to speak, that it was the duty of a philosopher to re-descend into the
cave and strive for earthly light, in much the same sense that Descartes started
by doubting everything other than what was, to him, indisputably clear in his
mind.
Using Descartes as a point
of departure, Spinoza took it upon himself to prove the rationality of the
universe. He saw that Descartes had left it in a state of extreme chance and
irrationality. Descartes left the universe in such a condition that there had to
be an ever-present super-rational deity to keep it wound up and working in
concert. Spinoza as a consequence redefined substance as that which underlies
the extension and thought of nature.
Spinoza levied the charge
against Descartes that his clear and distinct ideas were based upon a
super-rational faith, and declared that faith is not the way to truth -- nor is
presumed clarity of mind. Despite Descartes' belief that God would not deceive
him, it is conceivable that He might. Spinoza felt that only reason could
justify reason, and that the universe was inherently continuous and rational.
It
was also the very nature of the mind to recognize this order. Here, according to
Leibniz, is one of the fundamental errors in Spinoza's philosophy.
Refusing to accept
Descartes' solution to the mind-body bifurcation and attempting to supply his
own solution, Spinoza redefined substance as that which underlies the extension
and thought of nature. It is not that which exists (as we understand the word
exist), nor is it that which is intelligible. Rather, it is that in terms of
which we can define existence or intelligibility, i.e., God, or substance, as
speech is intelligible and has substance, a holding together as a whole. We can
know Him through a process of rational thinking. The material and the mental in
this system are but two among infinite attributes that are all aspects of
knowing and understanding substance or God. Mind and matter are expressions of
one and the same thing.
For Spinoza, however, the
court of final appeal for truth is the insight of the mind, not Descartes'
"clarity of mind." It naturally and inevitably knows. And when he
speaks of the mind knowing a thing, he means knowing what is its cause or
reason. By "cause" or "reason," Spinoza means what is
generally considered knowing the sequential order of things. Recognizing that
such a concept would ultimately lead to infinite regress, he had to find
something which is its own reason. With a spin on Descartes' concept of God,
Spinoza is led to propound his theory of substance, (11) in which he founds the
rationality of the universe. The underlying substance is self caused, for this
Substance is God.
By 'God,' I understand
absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which
expresses eternal and infinite essence. (12)
All infinite existences
are traceable to this Substance.
Since the mind can absorb
the order of the world, he considered this proof of the rationality of the
universe. Spinoza proves that there is an underlying Substance. This is
demonstrated through the use of four proofs (13) that show that if we admit, in
Tomistic fashion, the existence of something finite, God necessarily follows.
Leibniz felt that Spinoza
contributed nothing to the solution of the dualism of mind and body that Descartes so unsuccessfully tried to solve. Spinoza who denied the dualism which
Descartes would maintain insisted that the universe was monistic and all things
could be explained in terms of substance, attributes, and modes. It is senseless
to ask whether mind is or is not material; or whether body is for that matter.
Mind and the body are one and the same thing,
manifested through different aspects conceived at one time under the attribute
of thought, and at another under that of extension. For this reason, the order
of concatenation of things is one, whether nature be conceived under this or
under that attribute, and consequently the order of the actions and passions
of our body is coincident in nature, with the order of the actions and
passions of the mind. (14)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Origin of The Monad
The monad is not an
entirely new concept. There is no doubt but that Leibniz was greatly influenced
by pre-Socratic ideas and, I think, there is little risk in the declaration that
the monad had been in the process of development since the time of Anaxagoras'
demolishment of Parmenides' Plenum. It is true that Anaxagoras'
"seed" was infinitely divisible. However, it is the direction in which
his "seed" led us which makes the concept important. It led to the
philosophy of the atomists who retained some of the characteristics which were
attributed to Anaxagoras' "seeds" and which throughout the development
of the underlying substance of reality were still evident in Leibniz's monad.
Those qualities are worth mentioning here, for they are an indication of some of
the influences that effected Leibniz in the long period of time in which he was
formulating his concept of the monad.
Empedocles had divided
substance into particles of fire, air, water, and earth. Each of the elements
was indestructible, simple, homogenous, and incapable of change. As we shall
see, the first and the last were retained by Leibniz in his concept of the
monad.
Anaxagoras showed that
because of Empedocles' system of four elements, he was committing himself to the
position that a mixture of any of them would involve the creation of new
qualities in reality. For Anaxagoras, this was untenable. Parmenides had shown
him, that the appearance of new qualities was impossible. To overcome this
deficiency in the nature of Empedocles' "roots," Anaxagoras declared
that the primary substance was made up of seeds each of which had a little of
everything else in the universe in it and that no matter how infinitely these
"seeds" would be divided, each part would still be composed of a
little of everything. All things
. . . will be in everything, nor is it possible for
them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. (15)
Leibniz, of course, puts it
in other words.
Now this interconnection, relationship, or this
adaptation of all things to each particular one, and of each one to all the
rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express
all the others and that it is consequently a perpetual living mirror of the
universe. (16)
Anaxagoras'
"seeds," however, were not "created." Leibniz's monads were.
And too, the latter "mirrored the universe," whereas each seed was
different from the others because each of them was dominated by a particular
quality.
This should be sufficient
to show that there were definite influences in Leibniz's concept of the monad.
Descartes did not succeed too well in making a thorough going system of the new
science. Leibniz tried in a different way.
I should like, now, to
investigate the Leibnizian concept without further consideration of its origin
or development in relation to those problems that concern his disagreements
with Descartes and Spinoza.
Leibniz tried to avoid the
Cartesian dualism by combining in substance its ability to change in terms of
its native force, and its inherent awareness of the changes that took place.
According to Leibniz's
"Monadology," from points of force, or "monads," both
consciousness (relations of monads) and space (attributed qualities of a monad)
can be deduced. Activity, makes things what they are, (the characterization or
definition of a monad) and contains within itself the relation of one monad to
all others (the intelligible structure of the universe).
Hence, the monads are the
only real substances -- points of force which achieve extension only from within
themselves by striving for it. For Leibniz, the monad is both a metaphysical and
a mathematical point. Each monad is a single windowless entity bearing the
reflection of the entire universe -- a replica as it were -- containing within
itself its whole history and the law or formula of its whole future. The
intelligible structure of the infinity of eternal monads is reflected in
each monad, and each monad contains its own spirit or soul, its own motivating
power.
Here we see the clear
distinction between Leibniz's psychical monads and Newton's and Hobbes'
inanimate, i.e., mechanically interacting particles.
In a different way, Leibniz
started out to resolve this same difficulty that Descartes had in making a
thoroughgoing system of the new science. His concepts of substance and
attribute were best understood through his definition of a true proposition.
A
statement is true for Leibniz if the predicate is either implicitly or
explicitly contained in the subject. Substance is that which is the subject of
propositions; attribute is the predicate.
For when I state a proposition declaring a
certain relation between one substance and another, I am stating, in a way, an
implicit identity since predicates to be true are always bound up in the
subject. (17)
And since every
proposition is implicitly or explicitly an identity, (a questionable assertion,
to say the least), the attributes of a substance are contained in the very
nature of the substance itself. Relations between substances are, according to
this analysis, equally intrinsic as the attributes of the substances themselves.
In terms of Leibniz's Monadology, this means that substances, which for him are
points of force or activity, called monads, have not only within themselves
their qualities or characterizations but each monad has also inherent all
possible relations with every other monad as well. In other words, each monad is
at once itself and contains within itself the intelligible structure of the
universe (all actual and possible relations among monads).
For Leibniz, God, as
substance, is the creator of the harmonious order existing in the relation of
the monads to each other. For Newton, however, the order of the universe was
derived from the contact of particles with each other based on a few basic
principles of motion.
With Leibniz, the idea of
force or activity, the prime substance of nature, is defined as that which
brings about change in the future. Rejecting contemporary theories of motion by
which change was explained in terms of transference of energy by contact (a
billiard-ball universe given a first push and left to determine each other's
paths by interaction), Leibniz chose to define the world as being made up of an
infinity of "monads," each monad containing within itself the
determination of its role in the universe.
More than this, though
there was in each monad a certain degree of consciousness (as well as force),
that is, a certain amount of knowledge of itself, this awareness did not give
any one monad a knowledge of another's behavior.
Thus it was necessary for
Leibniz to invoke in his system a deity in order to account for harmonious and
orderly behavior among the monads. In terms of the principle of pre-established
harmony, God created each monad so perfectly that when certain changes take
place in the history of one, appropriate changes take place in the history of
all the others.
Thus God is necessary in
Leibniz's system to solve the problem of why the monads appear to interact as
perfectly as they do while being at the same time unconscious of each other.
In
this system, God is the creator, and "fulgurator" of the infinity of
monads which make up nature, making each one so perfect that He does not need to
direct or repair His system once it is set going.
In terms of Leibniz's
Monadology this means substances that for him are points of force or
activity without extension, called monads, have not only within themselves their
qualities or characterizations, but each monad has also inherent all possible
relations with every other monad as well. In other words, each monad is at once
itself and contains within itself the intelligible structure of the universe
including all actual and possible relations among monads.
This is what constitutes
the underlying substance of the universe. The superstructure depends upon a
plurality of monads and an infinity of them. Leibniz agrees with Spinoza and
Descartes in that substance is the central explanatory principle for the
rational explanation of the nature of the universe. He differs, however, as to
the nature of this substance. He shows the influence of mathematics when he
considers the monad as an animated point. Taking a hint from Galileo that
"the differential is a point of tendency with no regard to rest," (18)
Leibniz conceived his ever active non-resting monad of force.
Thus nature is defined as
that which brings about change in the future. But Leibniz would have no change
which was brought about by transference of energy by contact such as Newton's
theories implied. But Newton's particles had no awareness of their causal
effects. Leibniz' monad, however, contained within itself the determination of
its role in the universe. Not only that, each monad has a certain degree of
consciousness, also; i.e., it knew something of its own self. However, it knew
nothing of other monads and exercised no direct influence of change on them.
Leibniz describes them as
windowless and as reflecting within themselves the entire universe. The monad
develops from within. Its history is a consequence of inner impulsion not of
external impact.
Every monad is to a degree
a soul or self. Each develops solely by the law of its own being. In this
aspect, Leibniz expresses the core of the mathematics of his day. The monad,
therefore, expresses the law of an entire series and at the same time in
mirroring the universe is a complex unity. It is both one and many, unity and
complexity. Leibniz expresses this function with the analogy of the self or
soul. The human being is complex and it includes a variety of impulses in a
unity of feeling and purposive activity.
We now distinguish between
his three types of monads and the qualities with which he has endowed them.
(a)
The body monad is like an animated molecule. (b) The soul monad has memory or
conscious continuity. (c) The spirit monad is a thinking center that has
teleological purposes in view. Here, whether consciously of not, Leibniz has
synthesized Plato's and Aristotle's teleology with the mechanics of Newton,
Kepler, and Galileo.
Descartes and Spinoza
insisted that the mind has clear and distinct ideas. However Leibniz's body
monad has only dazed flashes of consciousness. Nature is continuous and there is
an infinite series from the lowest up to the most rational and self-conscious
monad. But we are not to suppose that the monads organize themselves to form a
human body or any other object out of consciousness of other monads. To
reiterate, they are unaware of and do not influence each other. All monads just
naturally group around the most highly developed or rational monads.
It seems here that Leibniz
is using Anaxagoras' concept that each monad having a little of everything in
the universe in it can be dominated by one of these things. (19) This makes way
for the differences in his monads. This is confusing. If a monad mirrors the
universe, then each monad would be dominated by the quality which dominates the
universe. This, of course would make all monads identical in every respect,
which is something Leibniz is not willing to admit, for God produces different
substances according to the different views He has of the world. (20) There is no
dead matter for Leibniz, however. Even the lowest monads, those at the very
bottom of his monadic hierarchy have some spark of consciousness, but it is of
such minute value that it is negligible in relation to the other monads.
As has been mentioned, the
monad is a point of force, activity or desire, without extension, that is, in
the final analysis, psychical. How, then, do we explain the physical-spatial
order? It is but the phenomenal expression of an infinite order of interrelated
monads. I, as an ego, am a monad, a soul monad. I am, as a physical and
psychical person, this same monad with a cluster of lower grade monads gathered
around it. The world order is a harmonious system of such groups of monads.
But,
these monads are not in space; space is in them. This holds for time also.
And
as Newton shows, his laws truthfully express the order and continuity between
spatial phenomena that are thoroughly mechanical but at the same time is only an
expression of an inner purposive teleological nature. (21)
Extension, too then, is
only force extending or pushing itself. Matter is resistance that is a force or
activity. It is not an inert substance as Spinoza and Descartes would make it,
i.e., inert particles which get their motion by impact, though in the case of
the latter, God initiates that motion.
Now, since the monads have
no extension, as points of force, when force is not pushing itself, we can take
an infinity of monads conglomerating without it adding up to extension. it would
seem, then, that extension can be achieved only with the desire on the part of
the points of force to be extended.
There is yet to be
proved,
however, how it is possible for there to be harmony in the relations of the
monads to one another if all the monads are completely unaware of the rest of
the universe. That is, even though they reflect the universe, they do not know
that their inner reflection is in fact an image of a world of monads, in
self-unpremeditated relations outside themselves. How then harmony?
Leibniz contended that God
is the creator of the world and does not need to concern Himself with its
operation once it has been set off. This is somewhat of a spin-off of the
Newtonian vein that change comes, not from the inherent structure of the
particles, but, rather, from their interactions.
From Leibniz's point of
view, God is not only the "fulgurator" of the monads but is the
creator of pre-established harmony also. He fixed it so that when any change
takes place in one monad, an appropriate change takes place in all the others.
(22) Thus, God is necessary to solve the problems of harmonious
interaction of monads each of which is not even aware that any other monad than
itself exists. God, then, is the Pure Activity, a la Bergson. However, monads
are activity also. Does this not make God a Divine Monad? That remains a
disputed point. But if that is so, even He cannot interact with any of the other
monads. In any event, once God set the pattern of pre-established harmony all
monads were at the mercy of that pattern.
Conclusion
Descartes
did not solve the dualistic problem. He did, however, pose it as an important
one. Spinoza and Leibniz, at any rate, considered it to be a serious problem in
their systems of philosophy. Spinoza tried to avoid the problem by combining
within substance, not only its material existence but, the causes, forms, and
intelligible structure of existence as well, i.e., mind and matter as different
aspects of reality. Leibniz tried to avoid it by combining the ability of his
"substance" to change in terms of its native force, with its inherent
awareness of the changes that take place within itself. But if Leibniz accuses
Spinoza of being in error in assuming that it is the nature of reality to
exhibit itself as it does, and that such an assumption does not answer the
question of what nature is, he, himself, is guilty of an even more glaring
error. And he uses a more elaborate, complicated, and tortured system for
accomplishing it.
Granting certain
assumptions, Leibniz's idealism did not deprive nature of reality. He has but
filled it with a pervasive spirit akin to man's. And at the same time he
made it dynamic according to the physical sciences of his day. But has he really
shown Spinoza "the error of his ways"? It seems, rather, he accepts
Spinoza's universe and merely fictionalizes it. He has presented us with infinite
psychical universes all of which are "fulgurated"
by and mirror the One Pure Universe that is God. (23)
But, Spinoza's universe is
God too. And it is a much simpler one to understand. To put it naively, as an
ego or soul, if Leibniz was serious about his monadic principles, being a monad
himself, he cannot say that there are monads outside himself. He can claim only
to have certain impressions within himself. He admits this. (24) He cannot know
that these impressions are of other monads for "they are without
windows" and he cannot see into them. This is the old epistemological
problem. How can he know about the outside world? He cannot, and does not, solve
it because he has gone to such great lengths to prevent knowledge of the outside
world ever getting into the inner sanctums of his windowless monads. They cannot
know that their reflections are of the outside world because God imparted to
them only the reflections, not the knowledge that there is another world. Leibniz, himself, being a monad, merely behaves according to God's pattern of
pre-established harmony. Moreover, he depends upon a god whose existence he
fails to verify and proves in an unsatisfactory manner.(25)
If he cannot know the
outside world how can he claim to know its nature. It becomes a fiction by his
own rules. Therefore, he cannot make any epistemically meaningful statements
about nature. He is restricted to statements about his own impressions.
But
granting him his concept of the monad, he does not settle the problem to which
he accuses Spinoza of not contributing. In like manner he doesn't contribute to
it either. If anything, he merely dispenses with one of the aspects.
For Spinoza,
substance appears to us in two aspects though reality is but one substance.
For
Leibniz, it is out of the soul of nature that its reflections of body and the
world must arise. And let us remember that reflections and thoughts are all that
the soul knows since it is unable to perceive anything outside itself. But the
reflections and thoughts must arise
. . .in such a way that they are in perfect harmony
with the universe at large but more particularly and more perfectly to that
which happens in the body associated with it because it is a particular way
and only for a certain time according to the relation of other bodies to its
own body that the soul expresses the state of the universe.
(26)
Surely one would not
maintain that this dispenses with the problem of dualism. He has told us nothing
more than that the soul has an image of the body in harmony with the body.
We
have always suspected this. But how is the harmony achieved? Why or how does
this perception of the body or the world develop in the mind in concert with
those outside objects? In answering that God causes it to be so, he has not at
all settled the problem. The soul knows only its psychical experiences.
It has
no experience with actual matter. Leibniz, it seems to me, with his windowless
monads, has left himself only a world of non-extensionable points of force.
Still, he can't convince us
that nature is alive and psychical because we observe so many examples of
inanimate objects like rocks, iron, etc. And if they were animated, how would we
discover it? Why can't we? If nature really consists of souls, why are we not
conscious of their presence and why are we incapable of communing with them?
Let us consider those who
maintain that Leibniz does have a material world (that is extended points of
force) in his system. I maintain such a viewpoint is epistemically meaningless.
In the first place, what is a "point of force" other than a
mathematical concept? The only force we know of is a sensation of push or pull
and the measurements of the interaction of bodies. This certainly is not
Leibniz's monad for there are no bodies prior to his monads. And, as Einstein
has postulated, we could very well do without such terminology as
"force." What, then, is something without extension as the term
'point' is so defined? It is but a positive synonym for "nothing" but
an idea.
As to
Leibniz's disagreement with Spinoza and Descartes on the question of causation, he resorts
to the same thing in disguised form. God is the first cause. And the pattern God
creates for the behavior of his monads is even more machine-like than is
causality that is based upon the concept of haphazard impacts or interaction.
If one could divine God's
pre-established pattern, one would be able to predict every event in the
universe, Leibniz's "freedom" notwithstanding.
As has been mentioned,
Descartes did not succeed in solving the problem of dualism. With Spinoza and
Leibniz, if we grant them their assumptions as to how substance is to be
defined, their dualistic difficulties almost disappear and their concepts fit
neatly into their respective systems.
The latter, however, must
be granted the further assumptions that there is a pre-established harmony and
that extension out of a point of force is conceivable. This is not to say that
they arrived at true solutions or that they solved all their difficulties
considering that extension of "point of force" results only in
extension of more mathematical concepts, not physicality.
If, however, we
do not grant
the validity of their basic concepts without first subjecting them to empirical
tests, we find that their systems are resting on shaky if not epistemically
meaningless foundations. Between Leibniz and Spinoza, however, even though I
have not shown a through case for the latter, his is by far the more firmly
founded system.
Still, I would insist that
our perceptions of an assumed physical world subject to the application of the
processes of logic and reason are the only valid criteria to be used in
discovering the essence of reality, whatever "reality" may mean.
Addendum
If
science had accepted the concepts or substance, activity, force, etc., as
presented by such philosophers as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Descartes we would
probably, today, still be living in the non-technical age of their times.
Considering the
intellectual atmosphere of their times, they may be forgiven their misuses of
language. It is unfortunate, however, that such brilliant intellectuals did not
interpret Newton's laws of motion not in mechanical terms, but rather in
psychical terms reminiscent of the advent of such terms as 'neurosis,' and
'psychosis' in their original designations, respectively, "physical"
and "mental." After all, if the story of the apple hitting Newton's
head has any validity to it, could not his laws of motion be interpreted to
include a quality of "sensitivity," as Leibniz hints at, to be an
attraction to, or repelling from other particles of matter rather than as
Hobbes' "dead" matter? Moreover, they seemed to have no inkling of the
history of language, or a most brilliantly simple idea so well, years later,
expounded by Locke:
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and
abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and
misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a
right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will
not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that
they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.
Considering the history
of the evolution of meanings attached to words, it is patently clear to me that
words, i.e., symbols, do not have inherent meanings. Meaning "exists"
only in the "minds" of intelligent entities.
Our three
intellectual titans did not seem to understand that or that the mind does not
absorb the order of the world but, to the contrary, as implied by William James,
creates an order of the world out of our confusing and differing perceptions of
events.
At least they should
have been cognizant of Hobbes' clear description of the nature of the physical
universe, and of their too often use of the fallacies of hypostatization and of
begging the question, i.e., offering non-falsifiable explanations incapable of
being verified. It appears that they were so rapped up in the ideas with which
they were dealing, they became blind to the fact that words do not give
existence to ideas but rather are only names of ideas and that ideas to not give
existence to facts but rather are derived only from experience, concepts, and
perceptions which in turn are based on the presumption of the existence of
physical substance.
Even though
philosophical rumination can be an instrument of sharpening one's critical and
analytical acuity, to confuse the language of theism, supernaturalism,
metaphysics, transcendentalism, and mathematics with reality has ever been
philosophy's epistemic weakness or at least the bane of arriving at truth about
the physical world. This is clearly attested to if one examines the history of
philosophy. For all its success in aiding the evolution of ideas and deriving
concepts generally agreed upon, one must wonder, in the final analysis, whether
the fundamental mantra of all philosophers, today, is no longer to pursue wisdom
but to agree to disagree.
In no way is the
above to be interpreted as a suggestion that the history of philosophy has not
been of incalculable value to the human enterprise. But philosophy has not
evolved sufficiently in concert with our advances in verifiable probable truth
and knowledge. In essence, it continues too much to be a presentation of old
wine in new bottles. It still examines concepts as if they are some form of
reality instead of being dependent upon reality for their "existence"
as functions of the brain.
So long as philosophy
continues in this fashion and remaining in Ivy Towers instead of greatly
influencing the quality of pre-college "education," the problems of
the world, that are so much founded on conflating ideas with reality, will
little decrease as we continue our history of man's inhumanity to man --
physically, psychologically, and, above all, educationally.
Notes
1. Discourse on Method, Descartes, Open Court Pub. Co. #38, 1Page 27.
2. Ibid., Page 35.
3. Ibid., Page 19.
4. Ibid., Page 35.
5. Ibid., Page 36-37.
6. Ibid., Page 35.
7. Ibid., Page 36.
8. Guide to
Philosophy, Joad, Page 502.
9. Discourse on
Method, Descartes, Open Court Pub. Co. #38, P. 39.
10. Ibid., P. 59.
11. "Spinoza
Selections," Scribners, Ethics P. 94, Part I, df. III.
12. Ibid., df. VI.
13. Ibid., Pp.
103-106, Part I Prop. XI.
14. Ibid., P. 209
Part III.
15. Fuller's History
of Philosophy. Pp. 70-80.
16. Leibniz, Open
Court Pub. Co. # 52, "Monadology" P. 263, #56.
17. Ibid., Discourse
on Metaphysics, P. 13.
18. Ibid., XVII-XVIII,
Pp. 29-33.
19. Ibid., "Monadology",
P. 252 #9.
20. Ibid.,
Metaphysics, P. 23. #XIV.
21. Ibid., "Monodology,",
P. 258. #36-37.
22. Ibid., "Monadology,"
P. 262. #50-51, Discourse on Metaphysics P. 26.
23. Ibid., P. 15. #9.
24. Ibid., P. 25.
25. Ibid., "Monadology,"
P. 260. #45.
26. Ibid., Discourse on
Metaphysics, P. 56.
© 1955, 1988, 2004 by Pasqual S. Schievella
© 1997 by Pasqual S. Schievella